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Abstract
This article investigates policies that are responsive to crime in disadvantaged, urban
neighborhoods from a community-based context. The vehicle is an analysis of a
community-wide prayer vigil held in Chicago in May of 1997. The vigil resulted from a
collaboration between the Chicago Police Department and hundreds of (mostly) AfricanAmerican churches on Chicago’s West Side. Strikingly, the local police district’s
commander facilitated the vigil. We explain the sociological and political significance of
this collaboration by drawing upon the “Chicago School” of urban sociology and
demonstrating theoretically and empirically the potential for the collaboration, through
the integration of key community institutions, to promote community capacity to resist
crime and to complete other goals and projects of residents. The article’s end addresses
constitutional questions. If collaboration between churches and the police through
religious activity enhances the community efficacy of poor minority neighborhoods, is
there any way to reconcile the benefits of such activity with constitutional concerns
about religious establishment? We focus on the extent to which African Americans have
been able to influence this jurisprudence through litigation rather than the internal
structure of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. A review of the litigation reveals the
particular nature of the involvement of African Americans in the development of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and it demonstrates plainly the extent to which
judicial sanction of church-state interaction has had, and continues to have, important
racial consequences. African Americans, through representative litigating institutions,
have consistently recognized the disparate impact of church-state partnerships, but the
Court has never acknowledged the non-religious implications of its Establishment
Clause decisions. As a result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is disconnected from
the realities of disparate impact, and that is potentially problematic for AfricanAmerican communities. We believe excavation of the realities of disparate impact is
critical in assessing the extent to which modern church state partnerships should be
allowed or even blessed by the state.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of this paper quotes biblical text from the Gospel of
Matthew: “For where two or three come together in my name, there am I
with them.”1 In May of 1997, these words were invoked as a kind of
catchphrase by participants in a set of extraordinary undertakings
between the Chicago Police Department and hundreds of predominantly
African-American churches on the West Side of Chicago. This
collaboration began with a “call to action” by the local police commander
and culminated in a community-wide prayer vigil in which groups of ten
stood on designated street corners and prayed to end violence in their
neighborhoods. On that day, not just two or three, but hundreds of West
Side church members and police officers came together in prayer for
their community.
In using this phrase as our title, we mean to do more than
highlight its use by participants in the joint police-church venture that is
the subject of this article. “When 2 or 3 Come Together” has sociological,
political and constitutional significance in the context of church-police
collaboration in poor minority communities. As a sociological matter, the
phrase brings to mind the potential for building community capacity to
resist crime and to complete other goals and projects of residents
through the integration of key community institutions. Its political
significance flows from the connection between the deployment of this
religious text by police and church leaders and a subsequent change in
the perceptions of West Side of Chicago (“WSC”) residents regarding the
legitimacy of local police in particular and local government in general.
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Matt 18:20 (New International Version translation)

The constitutional significance of the phrase brings together the
sociological and the political: If collaboration between churches and the
police in religious activity enhances the community efficacy of poor
minority neighborhoods, is there any way to reconcile the benefits of
such activity with constitutional concerns about religious establishment?
In other words, does the success of such ventures so depend on overt
demonstrations of public religiosity that the law and norms supporting
the concept of separation of church and state are (hopelessly?)
transgressed?
Together, these three related themes comprise the central inquiry
of this article. Our primary project is to investigate policies that are
responsive to crime in a community-based context, namely that of
disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods. Accordingly, Part one begins by
explaining the importance of community perspective in developing a
crime prevention strategy, discussing specifically the notion of ecological
crime policy. We then provide a sociological framework for understanding
the ways in which policy can engender improved community social
structure and norms of community-based crime resistance and
reduction. In Part two, we describe the methods of collaboration between
predominantly African-American churches in WSC and the Chicago
Police Department, and tie that description to the sociological theory
canvassed in Part One. Part two then offers empirical evidence that
provides support for the theory that the sociological benefits described in
the previous Parts can be obtained through church-police collaborations.
Part two concludes with an analysis of the factors that appear to be
responsible for bringing the WSC prayer vigil into fruition. Part three
departs from sociological theory and explores the constitutional issues
raised by church-police collaboration. Separation of church and state is
a firmly rooted political value in the United States, and police-sponsored
religious activity may be inconsistent with constitutional law, or at least
constitutional values
. Although we have no ready answer to this
problem, we argue that a productive consideration of this issue must
consider both the racialized context in which contemporary
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has arisen and the relationship
between African-American churches and the political efficacy of
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marginalized African-American communities. In this vein, Part three
explores the extent to which the interests and needs of African-American
communities have affected, and been affected by, judicial and political
decisions regarding church-state collaboration.
I.

CRIME AND COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES

Crime as a problem is often conceptualized at the individual level.
“A crime” occurs when one individual victimizes another individual.
Because we typically think about crime in individual terms, criminal law
policy inevitably focuses on fixing the particular individuals who commit
crime as the primary process of crime reduction. Although there are a
few criminal laws policies that address group criminality, such as
accomplice liability or the crime of conspiracy, these laws are still
animated by the notion of crime as a problem of individual offenders. It
is, however, possible to approach crime policy differently. Rather than
focusing on what particular individuals do and aggregating up, one can
conceive of crime problems from a community-level, or ecological,
perspective. Ecological crime policy, in contrast to individual-level
offender based policy, might focus on non-offenders and promote thirdparty efforts to reduce opportunities for offenders to offend. Even more
broadly, a community-based approach might seek to motivate entire
groups of people, including potential offenders, to voluntarily abide by
the law, rather than focusing on penalizing lawbreakers.
A.

Community Social Organization and Collective Efficacy

In thinking about potential ecological crime policies, it is important
to understand what it actually means to adopt a community-based
perspective of crime. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay pioneered the
study of crime through the lens of community.2 Seeking to explain their
earlier findings that juvenile delinquency remained high in certain areas
of central cities over time despite population turnover, they rejected
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See CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS: A
STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATIONSHIP TO DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (REV. ED. 1969).

individualistic explanations of delinquency.3 Instead, they looked to the
processes by which law-breaking behavior could be transmitted across
generations.4 They maintained that three structural factors—low
economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility—led to
the disruption of community social organization that, in turn, accounted
for variation in crime and delinquency rates in a given area.5 Because
Shaw and McKay believed that the capacity of a community to maintain
social control was a function of the structural context of that community,
they looked to the community itself as the explanatory unit. Rather than
trying to figure out what motivated individuals to break the law, Shaw
and McKay sought to explain why certain communities experienced high
crime rates over time while others did not. Their methodology and focus
on macro-level explanatory variables was a path-breaking approach at
the time. Shaw and McKay’s contemporaries believed that associations
between concentrations of African Americans and the foreign-born and
crime in urban areas was due to the individual dispositions of group
members, including genetic explanations for offending.6 Shaw and
McKay’s theory explained why their colleagues were wrong.
Though Shaw and McKay’s theory regarding social problems in
communities was ignored for quite some time, it has, in the last fifteen
years or so, made a comeback. Contemporary researchers have extended
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See id. at 315 (“It is clear from the data included in this volume that there is a direct
relationship between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and
differential rates of delinquents and criminals. . . . Delinquency—particularly group
deliquency, which consitutes a preponderance of all officially recorded offenses
committed by boys and young men—has its roots in the dynamic life of the
community.” ).
4 See id. at 174, 316-21.
5 Shaw and McKay found that the relationship between structural community factors
and deliquency was substantial. They found a a correlation of .89 between delinquency
rates and Chicago community areas and a proxy measure for poverty—the number of
families on relief. See SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 2 at 146-47. They found a correlation
of .60 between deliquency and population heterogeneity (percentage of foreign-born and
Negro heads of families). See id. at 152-55. Both of these correlations are quite strong.
See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, MODERN DATA ANALYSIS: A FIRST COURSE IN APPLIED STATISTICS
481 (1990) (Table 14.5. (explaining how to interpret the strength of correlations).
6 See ROBERT J. BURSIK & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE
DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 25-27 (1993) (discussing scholarly
disagreement over Shaw and McKay’s findings when they were published and
alternative explanations for high crime rates in urban areas).
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Shaw and McKay’s work by solidifying the notion of community
characteristics as distinct from the aggregated demographic
characteristics of individuals who live in communities.7 For example,
researchers have demonstrated in several studies that violence is
associated with poverty and residential instability in neighborhoods,
making it clear that violence is connected to neighborhood composition
as opposed to the spatial distribution of individuals with particular
demographic characteristics.8 Additionally, researchers have recently
made inroads in defining those characteristics that best enable social
control and the realization of the common values of residents—
community social organization.9 In describing the continuous nature of
community social organization, theorists have focused on three
processes: (1) the prevalence, strength, and interdependence of social
networks; (2) the extent of collective supervision by neighborhood
residents and the level of personal responsibility they assume for
addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) the rate of resident
participation in voluntary and formal organizations.10 Their hypothesis is
straightforward: when the processes of community social organization
are prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency should be less
prevalent, and vice versa.

7

The research is “ecological” rather than “psychological.” A fundamental assumption of
ecological research is that social systems exhibit structural properties that can be
examined apart from the personal characteristics of their members. See BRIAN BERRY &
JOHN KASARDA, CONTEMPORARY URBAN ECOLOGY 13 (1977).
8 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending:
Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 48-63 (A. Reiss and J. A. Roth eds., 1994)
(summarizing the recent work applying social-ecological theory to explanations of the
variation of criminal violence); Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder:
Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1995)
(describing how race and class segregation concentrates violent crime in poor, minority
neighborhoods).
9 See Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing
Social Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 777-82 (1989) (defining community
social organization this way); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD
OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 20-21 (1996) (same).
10See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 9 at 20 (offering these three characteristics); Robert J.
Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban
Inequality in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 45 (J. Hagan & R. Peterson eds., 1995) (same).

A 1989 study written by Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves
very likely spurred the current revival of Shaw and McKay’s work.11
Sampson and Groves examined the relationship between three
components of community social organization—levels of teenage peer
group supervision, prevalence of friendship networks, and organizational
participation—and crime using the British Crime Surveys of 1982 and
1984.12 They found that unsupervised teen peer groups had the largest
overall effect on self-reported personal violence offending rates in 1982.13
Unsupervised teen peer groups also had the largest overall effects on
both victimization by mugging and stranger violence in 1982.14 Local
friendship networks were substantially and negatively related to robbery,
and organizational participation had significant inverse effects on both
robbery and stranger violence.15 While the magnitude of the effect of
formal organization participation was not as large as the effect of
supervision of peer groups and friendship networks on stranger violence
and total crime victimization, the direction of the effect clearly supported
theoretical predictions.16 Perhaps the most important finding of the study
was that the community organization factors tested had a much larger
impact on crime than socioeconomic status.17 There is every reason to
believe that these findings are extremely robust. Sampson and Groves‘s
work recently was replicated by Lowenkamp and his colleagues using the
1994 British Crime Survey. The replication demonstrated the strong
mediating effect of local friendship networks, unsupervised teen peer
groups and organizational participation on the relationship between
structural characteristics of neighborhoods and crime.18 Lowenkamp and
his colleagues also found that after controlling for social disorganization

11See

Sampson & Groves, supra note 9.
a description of the data and methodology behind the study, see id. Note that the
analysis in this piece potentially suffers from the problem described above as it
attempts to characterize community-based processes through aggregated individuallevel data rather than through more direct measures of community characteristics.
13 See id. at 792.
14 See id. at 788-89 (tbl 3).
15 See id. (tbl. 3).
16 See id. (tbl. 3).
17 See id. at 789.
18 See Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Francis T. Cullern & Travis C. Pratt, Replicating
Sampson and Groves’s Test of Social Disorganization Theory: Revisiting a Criminological
Classic, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 351, 366 (2003).
12For
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measures, there was no statistically significant prediction
victimization, confirming Sampson and Groves’ important result.19

of

The astute will recognize, however, that the community social
organization processes identified by scholars do not have to be activated
in favor of norms that support law-abiding behavior. They are simply a
kind of infrastructure. For this reason, one of us has used the metaphor
“norm highways” to describe these processes in other work.20 The
metaphor helps to clarify the fact that the social infrastructure of a
community by itself can either inhibit or support crime. Whether
infrastructure supports a community’s efforts to resist crime will depend
on the kinds of norms that are transmitted among individuals who live in
a neighborhood. Like autos on an actual highway, norms can travel in
any direction on “roads” of neighborhood social infrastructure. Thus, the
“norm highways” of neighborhoods may facilitate crime as well as prevent
it.21
It is not enough to point to social processes, for such processes
may simply represent untapped potential to get things done. There is an
important normative aspect of effective communities that must be
considered. Ideally, communities exhibiting strong ties, high levels of
organizational participation, and high levels of teen supervision also will
be committed to activation of these resources for the good of the
community.
Researchers in the Project on Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods (“PHDCN”) have developed a concept to capture normative
dimensions of community efforts to resist crime. The PHDCN researchers
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See id. at 361.
See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 669, 676 (1998); Tracey
L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 395 (2000).
21 Sociologist Mary Pattillo has established empirical support for the notion that tight
social networks sometimes support criminal conduct on a community-wide basis. In
researching Groveland, a black middle-class community in Chicago, Pattillo found that
dense social ties “positively affect[ed] informal and formal supervision of youth . . . .But
. . . Groveland’s dense networks similarly allow for organized criminal enterprises.”
MARY PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK
MIDDLE CLASS 70 (1999).
20

coined a term—“collective efficacy”—defined as the ability of
neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents and maintain
effective social control.22 They found that collective efficacy explains a
large component of the variation of violence in Chicago neighborhoods.23
PHDCN researchers controlled for the effect of prior crime through a
statistical technique.24 They found, even after controlling for prior
homicide, that collective efficacy remained statistically significant and
negatively associated with homicide.25 This correction is a critical one
because in neighborhoods with high crime rates, residents may be
unwilling to engage in acts of social control, and this unwillingness in
turn facilitates criminal activity.26
To measure collective efficacy, PHDCN researchers utilized
particularly innovative methods. Survey respondents were not asked
about their own practices and opinions; instead, they were asked to
assess what happened in their neighborhood. Specifically researchers
tapped into residents’ assessments of neighborhood networks and
practices, as well as their opinions about the extent to which people in
the neighborhood shared the same values and trusted one another.27 In
this way, the researchers were able to identify important community
characteristics, paving the way for true ecological research.
22 See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbusch & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 91819.
23 See id. at 918.
24 See id. at 922.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 PHDCN researchers measured practices of informal social control through a five-item
Likert-type scale. Residents were asked about the likelihood that their neighbors could
be counted on to intervene if (1) children were skipping school and hanging out on a
street corner, (2) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building, (3) children
were showing disrespect to an adult, (4) a fight broke out in front of their house, and (5)
the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts.
To measure indicia of neighborhood social cohesion and trust, PHDCN researchers
asked respondents how strongly they agreed that: (1) people around here are willing to
help their neighbors, (2) this is a close-knit neighborhood, (3) people in this
neighborhood can be trusted, (4) people in this neighborhood generally don’t get along
with each other, and (5) people in this neighborhood do not share the same values. The
last two items were reverse-coded.
The two measures of informal social control and social cohesion were then combined
into one measure—collective efficacy.
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B.

Building Social Capital

In communities that demonstrate the capacity to “get things done,”
two dimensions, one structural and the other normative, work together.
The structural dimension is captured by measures of community social
organization, while the normative dimension is captured by measures of
collective efficacy. These two dimensions are species of social capital.
James Coleman has described the concept of social capital this way:
"Social capital . . . comes about through changes in the relations among
persons that facilitate action. . . . Just as physical capital and human
capital facilitate productive activity; social capital does as well."28
According to Coleman, social capital is realized through relationships.29
In an attempt to bring more clarity to the sometimes expansively defined
idea of social capital, Sampson, Morenoff and Earls distinguish the
structural dimension of social capital from the normative one.30 In their
view, community structural characteristics such as friendship networks
and participation in community organizations are potential resources
that a community might utilize.31 In contrast a community-wide norm of
adult supervision of neighborhood children for the purpose of social
control is positive goal-directed task that “activates” the resource
potential found in friendship networks.32
To see how community structural and normative social capital
dimensions work together, consider the social process dimensions we
have already discussed. When adults in a community work together to
promote a community-wide expectation that each will supervise the
community's children collectively, then increased supervision of youth

28James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC.
95, 100-01 (1988) (introducing and defining the concept of social capital and noting
that, “a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is
able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness.”)
29 See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990).
30 See Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital:
Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 634-36
(1999)
31 See id. at 635.
32 See id.

peer groups should follow.33 The reason is that a community-wide
expectation of youth supervision will not be meaningful unless
substantial numbers of the adults in a community believe they are
obligated to participate. One can imagine many ways of inculcating such
a norm, but one obvious way for a community of people to encourage
adults to engage in beneficial community-wide supervision of children is
by threatening a social sanction for the failure to do so.34 In order for
such a threat to be credible, however, there must be connections, or
social networks, among adults in a community to facilitate the
transmission of the norm from person to person. Without networks
connecting adults, it is too easy for any one adult in the community to
free-ride on the contributions of his neighbors without fear of sanction.
All of this means that local friendship networks should reinforce the
supervision of teen peer groups, which in turn leads to lower levels of
both victimization and offending.35
Friendship networks might also create another form of social
capital by facilitating information transmission between residents of a
community.36 Information channels may be especially important to
residents of crime-prone neighborhoods in central cities. Urbanization is
almost synonymous with densely populated communities, and
population density can be a barrier to social capital formation among
city-dwellers. The problem for many city-dwellers is not so much that
they have fewer acquaintances or weaker friendship networks than noncity dwellers; rather, the problem is one of proportion. The networks that
a city-dweller creates typically have less potential to include all of the
individuals in a community with which a resident will come in contact.
Put simply, high population density increases the number of strangers.

33See

Coleman, Social Capital, supra note 28 at 102-03 (1988) (pointing to mutuality of
obligation as an example of social capital). See also Sampson, Morenoff & Earls, supra
note 30 at 647 (presenting a statistical model suggesting that neighborhood residents
more actively are involved in child supervision when others around also do so).
34 See COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 29 at 244-45 (explaining the
relationship between the emergence of a norm and sanctions).
35See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 9 at 788-89 (demonstrating that supervision
of teen peer groups is associated with lower crime rates)
36See Coleman, Social Capital, supra note 28 at 104.
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Friendship networks make it easier for residents to identify who
“belongs” and who does not.
Participation in formal organizations is another community
structural factor that theoretically should reinforce the crime-reduction
benefits of both teenage supervision and friendship networks. Local
formal organizations provide community residents with important
opportunities to create overlapping relationships. Overlapping
relationships subject the residents of a community to expectations and
obligations in multiple contexts, and these obligations and expectations
often are transferable across different contexts. The existence of multiple,
overlapping relationships among a community's residents has important
implications for crime prevention.37 Friendships among neighbors that
are reinforced through individual participation in church groups, PTAs,
community policing organizations, and the like are very likely to increase
supervision of teenage peer groups in a community and increase
information transmission.
Recent empirical work refines the relationships between
community social capital and crime reduction. Utilizing PHDCN data,
which measures community characteristics in a more sophisticated
fashion that the British Crime Surveys, Jeff Morenoff, Robert Sampson,
and Stephen Raudenbush demonstrated empirically that friendship
networks, neighborhood organizations, and participation in voluntary
associations appear to reduce violence through the promotion of
collective efficacy.38 The authors use sophisticated statistical models to
disentangle the independent effects on homicide of structural dimensions
of social capital, such as social ties, and the normative dimension of
social capital, such as collective efficacy. In essence, the authors found
that dense networks alone are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain
37See id. (explaining the concept of appropriable social organization); Marvin D. Krohn,
The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation of Delinquent Behavior,
33 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 581, 583 (1986) (calling this process “multiplexity” and explaining
it this way: “if a person interacts with the same people in differing social contexts it is
likely that his behavior in one context will be affected by his behavior in another.”)
38See
Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, & Stephen W. Raudenbush,
Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence,
39 CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001).

homicide rates; instead, networks appear to create the capacity for
neighborhood residents to exert social control.39 The statistical models
the authors present show that social networks are positively and
significantly associated with collective efficacy.40 Similarly, the models
show that organizations and voluntary organizations appear to operate
indirectly on homicide by fostering collective efficacy.41
In order for neighborhood residents to utilize their capacity to exert
social control, there must be a willingness on their part to activate this
resource. The willingness to do this depends in large part on solidarity
and mutual trust among neighbors—a trust and solidarity that is
undermined by diverse and competing subcultures. Qualitative,
ethnographic research best demonstrates the ways in which conflicting
normative codes can undermine the extent to which residents of some
communities must overcome high barriers in order to promote values
consistent with law-abiding behavior.
In two ethnographic works, Elijah Anderson compellingly recounts
how the weakened structural fabric of an urban community called
“Northton” accompanied the transmission of two different sets of norms
among residents of the community.”42 Anderson describes in great detail
the clash between “decent” values (norms associated with hard work,
family life, the church and law-abiding behavior) held by some families in
Northton and “street” values (norms associated with drug culture,
unemployment, little family responsibility, and crime) held by others. A
central theme in Anderson's story of Northton is the gradual breakdown
of a community tradition involving the transmission of decent values by
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See id. at 548-49 (fig. 4).
See id at 550.
41 See id. Compare Ruth D. Peterson, Lauren J. Krivo, & Mark A. Harris, Disadvantage
and Neighborhood Violent Crime: Do Local Institutions Matter?, 37 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 31 (2000) (finding that recreation centers, but not libraries or retail
establishments, have a crime-reducing impact in extremely disadvantaged areas).
42See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
56-76 (1990) (describing the impact of wider economic changes on the African-American
community in Northton and introducing the notions of “decent” and “street”
orientations); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY VIOLENCE AND THE MORAL
LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35-65 (1999) (comparing “decent” families to “street” families).
40
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neighborhood “old heads” to neighborhood youngsters.43 This breakdown
accompanied the constriction of employment opportunities for the young,
increased neighborhood transience, and increased crime.44
Anderson's ethnography of Northton reflects the predictions of
social organization theory. As social networks in Northton weakened and
contracted due to residential instability, unemployment, and increased
drug use, a rival set of streetwise values flourished.45 The streetwise
norms that Anderson describes are at once a product of affirmative
reinforcement of lifestyles that focus on drug use and crime and the
vacuum created by the breakdown of broad social networks. For
example, when work in the formal labor market is not available for
significant numbers of a community's residents, a value system among
the jobless that affirms the pursuit of economic opportunities outside of
the formal labor market in the informal labor market, or even the illegal
drug economy, may arise.46 Furthermore, when social networks in a
community are weak and disparate, it becomes more difficult for the
community as a whole to emphasize the importance of seeking work in
the formal labor market.
Anderson's finding that streetwise values did not completely
overtake decent values in Northton helps us understand the functioning
of collective efficacy in a community. While many in Northton continued
to adhere to decent values, they still had to reckon with streetwise values
in their daily lives since those values predominated among the youth in
the community in public spaces.47 Of course, any time there are
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See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 42 at 69-76; ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 42
at 204-205.
44 See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 42 at chaps. 2 & 3 (describing the relationship
between economic changes in the Northton community and the attendant vulnerability
of the community to crime—especially drug offenses).
45 See id.
46See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 9 at 66-72 (explaining
in communities in which joblessness is prevalent, residents may internalize modes of
behavior that are inconsistent with preference for work in the formal labor market,
which is characterized by greater regularity in hours and consistency than informal and
illegal labor markets).
47 See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 42 at 98-106 (explaining how “decent” kids are
impelled to “code-switch” and adopt “street” personas in public).

competing value systems in a community, it is harder to establish a
common value set—especially one directed toward affirmative collective
efforts to resist crime as opposed to norms that support withdrawal from
public life. The problem is magnified, however, when the competition
takes on a generational conflict aspect.
For example, promotion of a norm of community-wide supervision
of teen peer groups is likely to be more effective when the level of social
capital among adults exceeds that among teens in the community. If
parents cannot count on one another to supervise each other's children,
then individual parents have to counteract the norms developed by
groups of teens—norms that may promote law-breaking behavior.
Unfortunately, when the social capital among teens is high, which often
is true in the communities containing street gangs, individual parents
face a dilemma. Each parent alone has little power to counteract the
power of the teen group. Moreover, the power of the teen group may
make the individual parent’s task more intimidating, causing her to exert
even less supervisory control than she otherwise would. This is, of
course, a very general description of some of the mechanisms that
underlie the withdrawal of Northton's “old heads” from community life.48
In her book, Black Picket Fences, Mary Pattillo’s description of
“Groveland,” a black middle class Chicago community, stands in stark
contrast to Anderson’s description of disadvantaged Northton. Pattillo
provides a rich account of the multiple ways that Groveland’s residents
exert social control over youth. For example, she recounts a local school
council meeting in which one attendee stated, “We have to take
responsibility for all of our children. The same children that are beating
up on our children are also our children. They go right around the corner
when they go home. They are our children.”49 This statement captures
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For a quantitative demonstration of the dynamics described here, see Sampson,
Morenoff & Earls, supra note 30 (finding that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods
have much lower expectations for shared intervention on behalf of children in public
settings even where the level of personal ties is not affected by concentrated
disadvantage in neighborhoods).
49 See Pattillo, supra note 21 at 78.
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the expression of collective efficacy through a particular institutional
process: a school council meeting.
Pattillo goes on to describe how participants at community
meetings of block clubs, police beats, church groups, and the chamber of
commerce, among others, devote a great deal of time to the issue of
youth supervision.50 Gangs and “gang-bangers” are the top concerns of
Groveland residents.51 Strategies such as removing pay phones from the
street, removing gang graffiti from buildings, hiring police monitors for
playgrounds, and providing activities for at-risk youth are employed by
the citizens in their effort to address gang issues.52 Pattillo’s description
provides real-life examples of the processes that Sampson and his
colleagues describe through statistics. Yet, Pattillo also demonstrates
how strong social networks can also support “corporatized” gang
activity.53 Pattillo explains that Chicago’s largest street gang, the “Black
Mobsters,” had a strong presence in Groveland and dominated a
Groveland park fieldhouse and other parts of the neighborhood,54 but she
describes how the top “Black Mobster,” Lance, is fully integrated into the
community.55 Lance makes sure that Groveland is clean because of his
self-interest in protecting his family and due to the numerous activities
of residents described above. Lance is an agent of social control in the
neighborhood, and the residents know it. Pattillo’s ethnography
demonstrates that in the midst of seemingly effective community social
organization, those involved in quite serious crime can exist quite
peacefully alongside those who abhor crime.
C.
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See id at 79-82.
See id at 80.
52 See id. at 79-82.
53 See Jeffery A. Fagan, Gangs, Drugs and Neighborhood Change, in GANGS IN AMERICA II,
(R. Huff ed., 1996) 43, (describing “corporate gangs” as those gangs with elaborate
cohesive leadership structures that exist to make money and that mimic business in
rules and group dynamics).
54 See Pattillo, supra note 21 at 83, 85.
55 See id at 85-90.
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This review of the sociological literature affirms that crime is a
community problem that can be usefully addressed from a communitybased perspective. For example, one of us has explained elsewhere how
to design policing strategies in ways that promote crime preventive
aspects of community social organization.56 Taking the community-based
perspective seriously implies policy directed at third parties in addition to
offenders designed to enhance the likelihood that crime rates in a
community will be lowered. Thus, while elsewhere one of us has
described crime policy such as reverse sting operations or anti-gang
loitering ordinances as particularly potent mechanisms for addressing
the community-based nature of crime, the theory outlined above makes
clear the police, or the state more generally, likely can promote
community social organization through more direct mechanisms—
mechanisms that create networks among individuals in a neighborhood
or networks between key institutions. So, for example, in Chicago, one of
the specific charges of the City of Chicago’s CAPS (Chicago Alternative
Policing Strategy) Implementation Office is to help neighborhood
residents start block clubs. The CAPS Office considers block clubs to be
one of the building blocks that makes community policing work in
Chicago. The CAPS Office believes that these groups are effective
mechanisms for focusing the attention of community residents on area
crime problems. But, it is also true that the block club can function as
an institution that brings individuals together who would not otherwise
have an incentive to interact. In this way, policy that promotes block
clubs also promotes opportunities for networking and the establishment
of norm highways.
The next section describes the West Side Chicago prayer vigil. The
Vigil, we will argue, helped to create a species of social capital in the form
of connections among institutions, as distinct from individuals, that
traditionally were not connected with one another. Connections that, we
think, could be activated in support of community efforts to reduce and
resist crime.
56

See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 217-27 (1998) (explaining how reverse drug stings and anti-gang loitering
ordinances potentially could support community social organization).
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II.

THE CHICAGO PRAYER VIGILS

In May of 1997, the first community-wide prayer vigil to end
violence against children was held on Chicago’s impoverished West
Side.57 The structure of the vigil was somewhat unique. The participants
stood in groups of ten on designated corners — the same corners where
lookouts often hawked contraband by calling out “Rocks and Blows!” —
and prayed for peace in the community.58 Following the prayer vigil, the
group was joined by thousands of other community residents who went
to a large park for a “praise celebration,” which included music from a
400-member gospel choir, food, and inspirational speeches.59 While the
size of the event made it unique, the number of people participating in
the day-long activities was not its most remarkable feature. What was
remarkable about the vigil was that its key instigator was the highestranking police officer of the Harrison District, Commander Claudell
Ervin.
Commander Ervin’s involvement in the West Side prayer vigil was
the product of a vision he had received approximately six months before
the event. In the vision, the Commander saw community residents
standing in groups of ten on street corners:
57 The vigil covered an approximately 15-square-mile area bordered on the North,
Ashland, Cicero and Austin Avenues. For media accounts of the day’s events see Gary
Marx, Cop Believes West Side Has a Prayer: Harrison Commander Uniting Thousands for
Vigil Against Violence, CHI. TRIB. May 2, 1991, at 1; Dave Newbart, Residents Take Faith
to the Streets for Vigil: Participants Pray for West Side Peace, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1991, at
1.
58 As neither of us attended the first vigil, detailed information about it was gleaned
through numerous interviews of participants and key organizers. Initial interviews with
key vigil participants were conducted May 22, 1997, June 11, 1997, and June 12,
1997. Following these initial interviews we constructed a list of potential interviewed by
reviewing sign-in sheets from the planning and evaluation meeting for the first prayer
vigil. Additionally we distributed fliers in local churches and asked interviewees about
others who might be interested in talking with us. Finally, we offered a small monetary
compensation ($10) for those who agreed to an interview. Fifty-five interviews were
conducted between 1997 and 1998. Forty-one of these represented individuals who
represent institutions. All interviews were conducted after promises of confidentiality
according to Human Subject Research Regulations at the University of Chicago, so their
names, with the exception of one from whom we obtained express permission, will not
be revealed in this Essay. The description of the 1997 WSC prayer vigil is taken from
these interviews.
59See id.

The Lord blessed me in such a mighty way when he gave me visions of
ten people on the corner. I could never understand why ten people. The
word says where two or three are gathered, I’m in their midst. Why ten?
But then on prayer vigil day, I see why ten. Ten makes a statement on
that corner. Two, three people, well, you know, what you all doing? You
all really ain’t doing nothing. But ten folks on the corner covers the whole
corner. You got to go around them.60

To act on the vision, Commander Ervin sent out letters to
hundreds of churches in the Harrison Police district containing an
invitation to church leaders to attend a meeting at the police district
headquarters.61 That the Commander invited church leaders to meet with
him was not particularly noteworthy. Community policing in Chicago
was and continues to be premised, at least in part, upon outreach to key
neighborhood leaders,62 and churches are central to disadvantaged
African-American communities in Chicago and elsewhere. Indeed, it is
not a stretch to say that churches are the central institution in these
communities. As sociologist Sandra Barnes has commented, “the historic
Black Church has been found to be an important economic, political,
social, and psycho-emotional buffer for African Americans . . . .”63 In light
of the key role of churches in WSC, it made sense for Commander Ervin
to seek out church pastors.64 In fact, interviews with key participants and
institutional representative revealed that Ervin’s immediate predecessor,
Commander Bolling, also had tried outreach to church leaders in the
Harrison district. Bolling’s efforts, however, proved to be unfruitful.
Bolling attempted to involve area church leaders in community policing
by inviting them to attend meetings in large Baptist churches in the
Harrison district. Bolling reasoned that as the Baptist denomination was
60

Interview with Commander Claudell Ervin, May 22, 1997. Commander Ervin gave his
permission to be identified in any published work associated with the WSC prayer
vigils.
61 Id.
62 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE
145-46 (1997) (explaining that churches constituted a “separate analytic focus” given
that churches were key in several of the prototype districts).
63 Sandra L. Barnes, Priestly and Prophetic Influences on Black Church Social Services,
51 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 202, 202 (2004).
64 See generally, C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990), and see text at notes 96-102, infra.
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the most prevalent among churches in the Harrison Police District, he
could attract a large number of ministers by cultivating ties with the
leaders of the most established churches. However, the only pastors who
typically showed up to the meetings Bolling planned were the pastors of
the host churches
Commander Ervin’s strategy to attract local area ministers was
different from Commander Bolling’s approach. Ervin invited the pastors
from various denominations to attend a meeting at police headquarters
as opposed to church buildings. And, interestingly, he signed the
invitation letter with an Old Testament Scripture. In contrast to the
poorly attended meetings convened by Commander Bolling, Ervin’s
meetings were well-attended by area ministers. It was during these
meetings at the Harrison District Headquarters that the police and the
pastors collaborated to plan a prayer vigil.
A.

The West Side Vigil as an Example of a State-Supported Social
Organization

The church/police collaboration that occurred in several West Side
communities in Chicago (“WSC”)65 beginning in 1997 presented such a
poignant example of a state-supported community social organization
endeavor that it prompted a study. Multi-faceted data was collected over
two years to assess the impact of two community-wide prayer vigils
facilitated by the police.66 The goal of the research was to explore whether
65

WSC is comprised of seven local Chicago Community areas either in whole or in part:
West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park, Austin, Humboldt Park, West Town, Near West
Side, and North Lawndale. According to 2000 Census Data, the 11th District accounts
for 2.8% of the total population of Chicago and ranks 19th among the 25 districts in
terms of population. See Chicago Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000
(2001). In 1997 there were more murders in the 11th district than any other district in
the City—69. See Chicago Police Department Annual Report 1997 at 16 (1998). The
same was true in 1998, 1999 and 2000. See Chicago Police Department—Annual
Report 1998 10 (1999) (noting that in 1998 the 111th district had 71 murders, 10.1% of
the City’s total); Chicago Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000 12 (2001)
(noting that in 1999 the 11th district had 79 murders, 12.3% of the City’s total); Chicago
Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000 13 (2001) (noting that in 2000 the 11th
district had 67 murders, 10.6% of the City’s total).
66 We collected data through five instruments administered between 1997 and 1999: (1)
Two mail surveys administered in 1997 after the first prayer vigil and in 1998 after the

the potential benefits of the theories of social organization and collective
efficacy explained above could be realized on the ground. The study
design was constructed keeping in mind that improved relations between
churches and the police can assist residents of neighborhoods concerned
about crime in three related, yet structurally different, ways. The first
structural path concerns the vertical relationship between the police and
the church. The second structural path emphasizes improvements that
flow from tighter and more prevalent horizontal relationships among key
community institutions. And the third path involves the individual
relationships that neighborhood residents have with one another. This
analysis reflects an application of Albert Hunter’s three-level schema of
social control.67
Hunter asserts that community social control occurs at three
levels: private, parochial and public.68 The private level is the most basic.
The private level of social order is comprised of an individual’s family and
friends—those with whom the person is closely connected. Social control
is achieved informally through mechanisms such as support and mutual
esteem at one end, and ridicule, criticism, and even ostracism at the
other.69 The next level of social order is the parochial.70 Individuals at this
level, while connected, do not have the same sentimental attachments
that are found at the private level.71 As a result, there is a much greater
likelihood for the formation of important so-called “weak ties” at the
parochial than the private level.72 Hunter points to the public level as the
second attempted to gage the level of institutional participation and the impact on
institutional linkages because of the vigils; (2) A survey of the population of police
officers in the Harrison district; (3) a randomized phone survey of 506 respondents from
the WSC area; (4) 55 open-ended interviews (14 individual-level and 41 institutionallevel) designed to obtain first-person descriptions of WSC, probe attitudes toward the
community, relevant institutions, the prayer vigil, and to get a sense of the vigil’s
impact.
67 See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime
and Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CITIZENSHIP
AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORRIS JANOWITZ
(Gerald D. Suttles & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985).
68 See id.
69 See id. at 232-33.
70 See id. at 233-34.
71 See id. at 234.
72 These ties are “weak” because the relationship between two people weakly tied is less
intense than the relationship between close family and friends. Mark Granovetter, who
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final level of social control. The public level is comprised of resources
external to the community such as bureaucratic agencies like the police
and other instrumentalities of government.73 The major difference
between this level and the other two is that the public level of social
control relies uniquely on its legitimate monopoly on coercion and force
to produce order. Hunter describes the criminal justice system as the
“ultimate” source of social control.74
The public level can legitimately use force to produce order;
however, this force alone cannot produce society’s desired level of social
control because of resource limitations and other formal constraints,
such as constitutional law.75 Social control at the public level is produced
through formal sanctions—the threat or actual imposition of coercion;
therefore, compliance at this level is produced through instrumental
means. Instrumental means of producing compliance depend upon an
individual’s fear of sanction to produce an effect.76 If one assumes that
people will comply with rule only if the threat of coercion is present then
it follows that instrumental methods of social control are contingent
upon the commitment to increasing the use of force if necessary. This
means that instrumental means of producing compliance can be costly.
For example, if deterrence is produced by maintaining a certain
probability of detection of rule-breakers, then authorities must be willing
to devote resources to maintain or increase the level of police in order to
insure meeting the requisite probability of detection.
In contrast to social control produced at the public level, social
control produced at the private and parochial levels is produced through
informal means and, therefore, is more likely to utilize normative rather

wrote the classic article on the topic, has shown, however, that such “weak ties” may be
critical for job searchers. See Mark S. Granovetter¸ The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J.
SOC. 1360, 1369-73 (1973); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 319-21 (2000) (emphasizing the economic value of
weak ties, which may be more likely to lead to job opportunities for whose strongest ties
are within economically disadvantaged communities).
73 See Hunter, supra note 67 at 238-39.
74 See id. at 238.
75 See id. at 238-39.
76 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990).

than instrumental methods of compliance. Given the limitations of
formal social control, social control often is produced informally and
normatively at the private and parochial levels. Individuals voluntarily
conform to the expectations of others by internalizing community
norms.77 In some situations the compliance produced through the
intermeshing of the personal and parochial levels of social order looks
much like compliance produced by the instrumental means at the public
level—sometimes people comply because they fear informal sanctions
imposed externally.78 However, the individual who complies for normative
reasons does so because she feels an internal obligation to do so.79
Social networks among friends and neighbors harness personal
knowledge and trust among family, friends, and neighbors to create
internalized expectations of obligation to conform to social norms.80
Thus, Hunter’s schema of private and parochial social orders
compliments the theories of social organization and collective efficacy
laid out above. While those theories help to explain how residents in
neighborhood are to resist crime through informal means without always
resorting to the police and other criminal justice entities, Hunter’s threelevel schema explains the relationship between a community’s informal
and formal efforts to produce safety.
Drawing on Hunter’s schema, we can see how improved relations
between the police at the public level of social control and churches at
the parochial level potentially benefit neighborhoods plagued by crime.
Newly formed connections between churches and the police on the West
Side of Chicago could produce a new species of social capital to be
directed toward violence control. For example, by interacting with church
leaders and parishioners, the police likely would gain access to new
sources of information to assist them in criminal investigations. Such
interactions might make church leaders and parishioners more willing to
identify offenders who victimize them, which in turn would allow the
77
78
79
80

See
See
See
See

id. at 24-26.
id. at 24, 59.
id. at 24.
text at notes 28-41, supra, on social capital building.

WHEN 2 OR 3 COME TOGETHER
police to more efficiently locate offenders.81 If more offenders are located
and arrested then the certainty of punishment increases and so does the
level of formal deterrence. Church leaders, on the other hand, could
parlay a stronger relationship with the police to gain better access to
municipal government resources.
Perhaps even more interesting than the benefits that flow from
better vertical relationships between churches and police is the way in
which improved relations on the vertical plane between the police and
churches can translate into stronger connections among the churches
themselves, as we explain below. If the prayer vigil led to stronger
connections among these key institutions Hunter’s theory suggests that
an improved community context for social control would obtain.
B.

Empirical Evidence Regarding Social Structural Change in WSC
1. Before the Vigil

Ideally, then, linkages between parochial and public levels,
represented in this study by churches and the police, must be prevalent
and strong in order to promote optimum conditions for effective social
control at the community level. Prior to the 1997 prayer vigil, the
linkages between the police the WSC churches were quite weak. Most of
the churches we surveyed reported only occasional contact with police.82
Semi-structured interviews with church leaders reveal a more complex
story. In addition to being only “occasional,” it would appear that the
contact between police and churches in the area we studied could best
be characterized as reactive—leaders called police when they needed
81 See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization
In the United States, 1999 Statistical Tables, Table 103, Percent of Reasons for not
reporting victimizations to police, by race and type of crime (indicating that some
victims do not report victimizations to police because they believe police to be
uninterested, inefficient or biased).
82 In a mail survey of area churches administered shortly after the 1997 Vigil, 30 of 61
respondents characterized their contact with police as occasional friendly contact. In
another survey administered a year later after the 1998 Vigil, 32 of 61 respondents
noted that they had occasional contact with the police. Eight-five percent of these
respondents characterized their contact with police as “cooperative.” But, importantly,
about 17% of respondents maintained that they had no contact at all with the police.

them. The responses of a young associate Baptist minister, the senior
pastor of a 300-member church in East Garfield Park, and the executive
director of an interfaith organization are indicative:
Interviewer: Okay. I want to talk about the police. How would your
characterize your organization’s relationship, past relationship, we’re
talking pre-vigil, with the local police?

Rev. Assoc. Baptist: They don’t bother us. We don’t bother them.

*

*

*

Interviewer: How would you characterize your church’s relationship with
the police before the prayer vigil?

Pastor Community Church: We really did not have one. . . . And if we
needed them we called them.

*

*

*

Interviewer: How would you characterize your church’s relationship with
the police before the prayer vigil?

Community Leader: I guess I would characterize it the same way I
characterize a private citizen (inaudible), very little contact. And that’s
about it. Very little contact.

At first glance, the reactive nature of the relationship between
churches on the one hand and police on the other in WSC might not be
particularly remarkable. However, when one recalls that the residents of
the Harrison Police District faced (and continue today to face)
extraordinary crime problems, it is becomes significant that the key civil
institution in the community made little effort to work with the primary
governmental entity charged with addressing crime on a more proactive
basis. Another way to make this point is to say that to the extent that
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contacts between Harrison District churches and police created a
relationship between the two key institutions, that relationship was not
harnessed in favor of collective efficacy.
In contrast to the relationship between the churches and the
police, there were more and prevalent linkages among WSC churches.
However, the data reveal two features of inter-church collaboration
suggestive of the fact that the full potential for social organization
directed to solving community problems was not fulfilled. First, many of
the links were intra
denominational. Second, the social capital in these
links was not being directed, as a normative matter, to the problems that
the community rated at the top of their list—crime.
In a mail survey to churches we asked church leaders to
characterize their level of contact with organizations of: (1) the same
religion; (2) the same religion but different denominations; and (3)
organizations of different faiths. The following graph is an illustration of
the relative levels of frequent contact church leaders claimed to have with
these three different groups: 83
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The responses to the church mail survey are not truly representative of the
population of the area. They are, however, more representative of the actual prayer vigil
participants. The data represented in the graph collapses the respondents from two
waves of mail surveys.

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
same denomination

different denomination

different faith

We argued above that the reactive nature of the limited
relationships between WSC churches and the police prevented the
groups from harnessing their relationship in favor of collective efficacy.
Our data suggest a parallel problem existed with respect to goals for
which the relationships among WSC churches were harnessed.
Specifically, the data indicate that prior to the prayer vigils the networks
among area church leaders were not primarily (or even secondarily)
directed toward everyday problems facing the community. To the extent
that church leaders were getting together with one another, it was rarely
for the purpose of addressing chronic community problems such as
crime. For the most part when area church leaders met collectively, they
did so for the purpose of addressing traditional church business. For
example, one interdenominational group of African American WSC
ministers met regularly to update each other on new ministries or to
allow new ministers to try out sermons. Occasionally the group dealt
with civil rights issues, but they did not organize in order to deal with an
issue of “every day” living such as crime. Here are the words of a senior
Baptist minister:
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The ministers and churches have always been in the forefront in
segregation and many issues. In the past, we have responded mostly to a
crisis. This time, the commander called us together and said we're going
to make a change in the community because of the problems, not
because of one particular thing that was going on. This time it brought
together many, many people because of wanting to make a change in our
every day living. . . . . But this have seem to held us together because
more than just ministers, the communities, the police department came
together and though we had those type of movements before, not in this
particular way, not this kind of motivation. It brought together more
fellowship even between the churches, not just to respond to a crisis but
communication and moving and being on the same wave length.

Wes Skogan and Susan Harnett, who have completed an in-depth
study of community policing, documented a similar phenomenon. Of the
approximately 50 religious organizations they surveyed, fewer than 10%
had a crime-prevention mission.84 Moreover, Lincoln and Mamiya’s
survey of Black churches reflects our data. In their survey, of the 60% of
respondents who participated in any ongoing projects that required
interdenominational cooperation, only 2% (30 churches) stated that they
cooperated with churches of other denominations on social oriented
programs such as drug or alcohol abuse, crime, welfare, housing, etc.85
To put this in perspective, consider Lincoln and Mamiya’s research
demonstrating
that
7.2%
of
those
churches
engaged
in
interdenominational activities participated in interracial cooperation with
white churches. It is reasonable to assume that for the most part the
white churches to which survey respondents referred were located
outside the respondent church’s neighborhood.86 Thus, according to the
most extensive survey of black church activity to date, it was more likely
at the time of the survey for black churches to work with a church from
another sect outside of the neighborhood as a demonstration of
84

See WESLEY SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 145
(1997).
85 See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 64 at 156.
86 See id.

interracial unity than it was for the black churches to engage one
another across denominational lines on a problem as important to local
parishioners as crime.
2.

After the Vigil

To assess the potential social organization benefits (and potential
costs) of the WSC prayer vigil, both respondents who participated in the
Vigil and those who did not were asked questions that tapped into the
two dimensions of social capital: structure and affect. Because we were
particularly interested in assessing Hunter’s ideas regarding parochial
level integration, we asked institutional leaders in WSC whether they
formed new relationships with other institutional leaders as a result of
participation in the vigil. Similarly, we assessed changes in affect by
asking institutional leaders about the likelihood of harnessing new
relationships for cooperative efforts.
With respect to structure, the survey results reveal that about 50%
of respondents stated that they have formed between one to five new
relationships resulting from participation in the Vigil. With respect to the
affect dimension, church leaders were asked whether their opinions
regarding various community institutions had changed and whether they
believed that cooperation between the leader’s own organization and
various types of community organizations was more or less likely. The
following two charts summarize these data.
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Each of these charts summarizes the newfound potential for
greater social organization in WSC. By and large, after the vigil, church
leaders had more positive views of other key institutions in WSC than
prior to it. Moreover, leaders claimed an increased likelihood of
cooperation among these institutions for the purpose of getting things
done in the community. Additionally, church leaders stated that they felt
better about the community’s prospects after the WSC prayer vigil. Fully
82% of respondents believed it was more likely after the prayer vigil that

the community could get organized to help itself. Fifty-eight percent of
respondents felt that after the vigil the police were more concerned about
the well-being of the community’s children and the community itself.
Even 39% of respondents felt that after the vigil, the city government
would help WSC improve.87
It is important to note here that the data summaries above include
both church leaders who participated in the prayer vigil and those that
did not. Almost a third of our respondents did not participate in the vigil,
yet they appear to have been influenced in a positive direction merely by
their awareness of the event. While 80% of vigil participants reported
feeling more positive about the police after the vigil, 50% of non
participants claimed the same. Not one of the non participants reported
feeling more negative about the police after the prayer vigil. Similarly,
while vigil participants were more likely to register intense feelings about
the likelihood of future cooperation with important community
institutions, non participants still registered positive feelings about the
likelihood of future cooperation.88 This finding is quite striking and
suggests that the WSC prayer vigil had an impact on the community
extending beyond the particular participating individuals.
The in-depth interviews help to motivate these findings—especially
in terms of individual expectations about the community’s prospects. A
Catholic priest summarized his feelings this way:
I think the prayer vigil, number one, is a challenge to every individual
church, organization or whatever: What are you doing? Are you doing
anything? It’s time to get busy. It’s time to do some things.

Creating expectations for action is a critical component of collective
efficacy. The fact that institutional leaders in WSC were better connected
87

Note, however, that in answer to this question, 46.3% of respondents felt that it was
no more true after the vigil that the city government would be helpful.
88 For example, 50% of participants claimed that interdenominational cooperation was
much more likely in the future compared to only 10% of nonparticipants, but majorities
of both groups were positive about the likelihood of future cooperation—77% of
participants and 53% of nonparticipants respectively.
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after the vigil provides the structural predicate to reinforce this
expectation, just as Hunter would predict.
The data is inadequate to allow a complete assessment of the
extent to which these new linkages, along with rejuvenated enthusiasm
for community control, has translated into concrete projects. But telling
anecdotes abound. For example, researchers attended meetings of the
interdenominational Minister’s Alliance that was formed in order to
promote prayer vigils subsequent to the 1997 WSC prayer vigil. It was
not uncommon to see secular service providers utilizing Alliance
meetings as opportunities to promote their services. Post WSC prayer
vigil meetings featured social service purveyors. At one meeting an
organization encouraged pastors to sign up children to receive free school
supplies. At another meeting, representatives of the CPD asked ministers
if they would help to recruit new police officers from their congregations.
The ministers again functioned as certification intermediaries, but this
time, the certification was for the primary benefit of the police instead of
for the benefit of congregants. Other meetings focused on crime policy.
One meeting was devoted to the level of support the ministers would offer
to the City’s original anti-gang loitering law. Another meeting was
devoted to “SODA orders” (stay out of drug area orders), proposed
legislation to exclude from WSC neighborhoods individuals who had been
convicted of drug selling provided that the individual to be excluded did
not live or work in the designated neighborhood. These examples clearly
indicate the extent to which an improved vertical relationship between
the police, representing the public level of social control, and the church
leaders, representing the parochial level of social control led to an
increased level of social capital for residents of WSC.
We noted above that Hunter’s 3-level schema predicts that higher
levels integration between the public and parochial levels could provide
WSC church leaders with the opportunity to gain more access to
municipal government resources. That state of affairs appears to have
taken place in WSC post prayer vigil. Less obvious, however, was that the
newly-formed relationship between WSC ministers and the local police
would provide the ministers with increased political efficacy. After the

prayer vigil one key minister was appointed to serve on the City’s Police
Board—the first minister to hold such a position. Another young pastor
was appointed to a high-level position in city government related to
community policing. Perhaps most interesting is evidence that the post
prayer vigil relationship between WSC church leaders and the police was
such that WSC church leaders were able to translate the relationship
into the power to better hold the CPD accountable to the community’s
interests. Consider the following telling case.
Several months after the May 1997 prayer vigil, one young minister
from the East Garfield Park neighborhood walked into two CPD officers
arresting a man from the neighborhood. The man did not attend the
young minister’s church; nonetheless, the minister decided to find out
what was going on. The CPD officers asked the minister to step away
from the arrest scene, which was unfolding peacefully, but the minister
refused. The circumstances that followed were contested, but the
conclusion of the events was clear—the minister was arrested. As the
minister was processed at the Harrison District headquarters,
Commander Ervin saw him and recognized him on his way out of the
building. No doubt because of the newly formed relationship with area
ministers, Commander Ervin asked a lieutenant, the highest ranking
officer in the building, to see to the minister’s needs in the Commander’s
absence. When Commander Ervin returned to headquarters to speak to
the minister himself, he learned that the minister had already invoked
his right to remain silent and to speak to a lawyer, so Commander Ervin
was not allowed to talk to the young man. That evening, several of the
ministers from the Alliance held a press conference complaining about
racial profiling in WSC. Other ministers met in a group with the
Commander to settle the dispute. After several meetings, the dispute was
resolved.
What is interesting about this incident is the urgency to solve the
dispute that Commander Ervin demonstrated. After the WSC prayer vigil,
the Commander’s relationship with the ministers was an important
source of his legitimacy in the community. Commander Ervin depended
upon the ministers’ favor to develop the community’s trust in him. While
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the pastors’ relationship with the Commander and the CPD was not
critical to their position as leaders in the community, the relationship
certainly enhanced their position in the community as heads of central
institutions. Many of the ministers who participated in the WSC prayer
vigil believed that their relationship with Commander enabled them to
procure resources for the community from the CPD and from the City
that they had not been able (or had not been as able) to procure prior to
the establishment of a stronger vertical relationship between WSC
churches and the police.
In a sense this crisis enhanced the benefits of the relationship from
the ministers’ perspective. Although the ministers were motivated in part
to protect the honor of one of their own, the incident allowed the
ministers to demonstrate to the community (and to the police) that
collaboration with the police would not inevitably lead to their being coopted by the police. The police learned an important lesson as well. They
learned that the social capital in their relationship with the ministers had
to be tended and guarded. In other words, they learned the potential cost
of being an agent of the community rather than vice versa.
It is not a stretch to say the WSC prayer vigil was a key event that
motivated critical rethinking of community policing in Chicago. After the
vigil, the City became much more interested in fostering local grassroots
events for the benefit of community policing. Moreover, churches and
faith-based institutions have become an even more prominent feature of
Chicago’s CAPS strategy. In September of 2004, the City of Chicago and
the Chicago Police Department sponsored the ‘largest gathering of faithbased leaders to date” at McCormick Place for a day of workshops
devoted to community economic empowerment, offender re-entry, grant
writing, HIV and public health, responding to the hip hop generation,
and public policy reform.
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3.

Implementing the WSC Prayer Vigil

We have just presented a picture of the linkages among WSC
churches and between the churches and the police prior to the landmark
1997 community prayer vigil and after it. The data strongly suggests that
important linkages have now been formed between key community
institutions that did not exist prior to the vigil. We turn now to a critical
question: How did this happen?
As a first pass at answering this question it is useful pose a
different query: What were the structural barriers to cooperation among
the churches themselves? The answer to this question became clear after
only a small number of interviews with church leaders. The governance
structure of the predominantly Protestant local churches in WSC, while
facilitating democratic participation by members, created collective
action problems for coordination among the leadership of individual
churches.
One hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was their wide
diversity of denominations and faith traditions. Our survey respondents
were a mix of church leaders from 15 different Protestant denominations
including, but not limited to, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, A.M.E,
Catholic, Christian Disciples of Christ, Baptist, Church of Christ, Church
of God in Christ, Christian Reformed, Non-Denominational, and
Independent. To refer to these many denominations as simply,
“Protestant,” belies the variation among them in terms of faith practice
norms, liturgy and training of the pastors themselves. Once we add to
this mix the fact that there were survey respondents representing the
Catholic Church and the Seventh-Day Adventists, few would be
surprised to learn that there is distrust among ministers of various
denominations and religious practices. Tellingly, Meares interviewed at
least one Protestant minister who responded that he had had contact
with church leaders of a different faith—Catholic priests.89
89

The historical antagonism between Catholics and some Protestants, especially
evangelical Protestants, has a long history in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT
WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD

Denominational cleavages in WSC are supported by demographic
differences between sects. There is, of course, a great deal of
demographic variation among congregations within denominations, but it
is also true that denominations are known to have distinctly different
demographic characteristics. For example, in their landmark study of
Black Churches, Lincoln and Mamiya found that traditionally black
Methodists tend to come from the middle-income bracket, while the
majority of Pentecostal Church of God In Christ (COGIC) members are
working class or working poor.90 Baptist churches represent the largest
chunk of churched African Americans and reflect a diversity of social
classes,91 while a 1993 study of African American Catholics indicates
that they have higher median incomes than individuals with any other
typical African American religious affiliation—exceeding the median
income of Baptists by almost $4,000.92 These income differences likely
accompany
variation
in
educational
attainment,
occupational
achievement, and the like among members of the various sects. Church
organization leaders often serve different, but overlapping, parts of the
WSC community. They therefore are located in various social networks
and operate within different spheres of influence. All of these factors
present barriers to communication among church members and church
leaders. Yet, the same factors portend a great yield in terms of social
capital should the church leaders manage to overcome barriers. Obvious
benefits of increased contact among individuals from different
denominations include an increase in access by the more disadvantaged
individuals to jobs, opportunities, and life expectations.93
A second hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was
individual, as opposed to institutional, in nature. WSC churches by and

WAR II 72-76 (1988). I did not get the sense that the Protestant minister whom I
interviewed held animus against Catholics; rather, he just had not worked with many
Catholics—proving my point here.
90 See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 64 at 172 (1990).
91 See id.
92 See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD (1993).
93 Compare WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1987) (explaining that concentrated disadvantage
results in social isolation, “a lack of contact or of sustained interaction with individuals
and institutions that represent mainstream society.”)
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large are denominations in which the minister serves at the pleasure of
his congregation.94 As such, the pastors of these churches must attract
congregants for support. Interviews with church leaders revealed that
simple competition among WSC ministers for congregants who could
contribute to the collection plate played a large role in keeping the
ministers from working with one another.
Commander Ervin was identified in interview after interview as the
individual who could address the various barriers to communication
among WSC church leaders.
A Methodist minister had this to say:
Interviewer: Do you think that all of the churches would have got
together and had an event like the prayer vigil if the police had not been
involved?
Methodist Minister: It would have taken a leader of someone to bring
them together and I don't see anyone in the West Side area that could
have gotten all of the churches involved as they did.
Interviewer: Why? Why is that? When you say you don't see –

Methodist Minister: Because of denominational barriers. Seventh Day
Adventist would not have come out if I had started it. The Baptist would
not have come out if the Seventh Day Adventist had started it. The
Catholics would not have come out if the Baptist had started it. So it
took an outside interest that could draw all of them together.
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Lincoln and Mamiya document that in 1989, 38,800 churches were organized under
the National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., the National Baptist Convention of America,
or the Progressive National Baptist Convention. See LINCOLN AND MAMIYA, supra note 64
at 31, 35, and 37 (documenting the number of churches in the three denominations in
1989). This represents 64% of the churches of traditionally African American
denominations. African American Methodist (AME) and Pentecostal denominations
make up the remainder. See id. at 54, 58, 64, and 84 (documenting the number of
churches in three AME denominations and the number in the Church of God in Christ
(COGIC) denomination). Lincoln and Mamiya note that Baptist ministers are not
appointed to a church by a higher ecclesiastical authority. See id. at 42. Churches
belonging to the COGIC denomination, while not as free-standing as Baptist churches,
tend to exercise considerable autonomy. See id. at 84-88.

A Baptist minister agreed:
Baptist minister: . . . I'm involved in another project where we are
actually trying to pull together the leadership from the seven major black
denominations. And we've been at this thing several months, and it's not
happening. It is not happening at all. And it's always scheduling,
scheduling. No, you know. Sometimes persons may be more inclined to
participate in something that is called together by a body other than a
denomination, you know. Yeah. Probably participation of ministers would
not have occurred on the scale that it did had it been had I called or
something like that.

And here are the comments of a CDC officer on the same point:
Interviewer: Do you think that, you know, assuming that a church had the
resources to do it, do you think that they could have pulled it off?
CDC Officer: No.
Interviewer: Why not?
CDC Officer: Because like any other groups of people in the world there are
factions. There are the Baptists, there are the Catholics, there are the Lutheran,
there are the Protestant, there are the everybody. And each group has a central
figure that they look up to. For instance, there's a contingent of pastors who
look up to Reverend (inaudible) because he has been there for years and he
knows and he has the wisdom, and so they follow him. Younger pastors
(inaudible), they follow him. Reverend X over on President Street, he's another
very powerful minister. He has a contingent of pastors who follow him and adore
him and look to him for wisdom. You would have had to bring all of those
factions together. Now, those are power bases with those ministers. And this
minister does not get along with that minister, and that minister doesn't get
along with that minister, and this faction is not cooperating because this
minister says no. So I think the commander as the central point of power in
many ways was able to bring the factions together. That's where he came in. He
went to this pastor who had this group and said, listen, we really need to pray,
we need to bring everybody together and we need to, you know, do this on one
accord, and I want to work with you and I want to work with Reverend
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(inaudible), I want to work with this one, I want to work with that one. And
(inaudible) that came together.

Note, however, that in promoting the WSC prayer vigil,
Commander Ervin had to overcome more than the significant
communication barriers among the participating churches. He also had
to overcome the skepticism of police of WSC residents born of the
traditionally antagonistic relationship between the churches and the
police in Chicago’s African American neighborhoods. Highlighting these
two hurdles suggests that a simple request by a high-ranking local police
leader of the churches to work together would be inadequate to motivate
the churches to work with the police or with each other. There is
additional evidence to buttress this conclusion. As we noted earlier,
Commander Ervin’s predecessor, Commander Bolling, reached out to
WSC church leaders with little success. However, Commander Bolling’s
approach didn’t work. Why not?
The answer is that it took a combination of individual religious
outreach from a position of organizational neutrality. To achieve higher
levels of collaboration between the police and church leaders it was
necessary for Commander Ervin to meet the pastors on their terms. Not
surprisingly, operating on the ministers’ terms meant speaking from a
religious standpoint. In 26 of the 40 institutional-level interviews,
respondents emphasized the Commander’s religiosity. His spirituality
was important to vigil participants—they repeatedly drew attention to it
as they explained why his efforts met with success.
Highly-churched95 WSC residents were attracted to Commander
Ervin’s spirituality. Respondents tended to discuss the Commander’s
spirituality in two ways, though several cited both as important. In the
first category were those who described the Commander as a deeply
95

Our randomized phone survey shows that 75% of WSC residents reported attending
church. Approximately 50% reported attending church weekly, and 90% reported
attending at least once a month. But see C, Kirk Hadaway, Penny Long Marder, & Mark
Chaves, What the Polls Don’t Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance, 58 AM.
SOC. REV. 741 (1993) (demonstrating that church attendance rates for Protestants and
Catholics, are, in fact, approximately one-half generally accepted levels).

religious man whose spirituality was a force to be reckoned with. The
second category of respondents referred to the commander as a Christian
or as churched—descriptions which mean largely the same thing in
WSC. These individuals suggested that the Commander’s success was at
least partially the result of his religious affiliation.
Both of these aspects of religiosity were important to gain the trust
of WSC ministers. The effectiveness of the Commander’s strategy can be
seen in the interview responses. The young associate Baptist minister
referred to above suggested that the Commander’s religiosity helped
overcome the objections of those who distrust the police. He said:
First, they didn’t want to be a part of it because it was a police
commander. It was the police, to long it up, it was the police. But then
after seeing he was truly a man of God - proved himself for the most part
- then they came on board and got involved in it, and word of mouth
went around and other people started coming out.

Another WSC community leader put it this way:
I don't believe it was really organized by the police. I believe it was
organized by a Christian who happened to be a policeman. And that's a
world of difference.”

To understand the appeal of Commander Ervin’s persona as a man
of faith to the many religious leaders interviewed during this study, a
deeper understanding of the central role of the churches to the many
African American residents of WSC is helpful. Domestic and
transnational polls have long supported the fact that “American blacks
are, by some measures, the most religious people in the world.”96
Compared to white Americans, African Americans attend church more
frequently, participate in other church-related affairs more often, and
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GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE’S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE 90’S
122 (1989).
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belong to more church-affiliated organizations.97

Our randomized

telephone survey of WSC residents is in accord with this research. Eighty
percent of the African American respondents mentioned attending
church at least once a month—the modal response was weekly—
compared to 43% of white respondents.98 In addition to registering a
connection with church institutions, African Americans are more likely
than other groups to say that God is important in their lives.99 Even
African Americans who are not current church members or who do not
regularly attend church report praying daily in high numbers.100 Based
on this, the special resonance that religious references and church
culture have for many African Americans, WSC residents included, is not
very surprising. Church culture provides a blueprint for neighborhood
activities, whether explicitly religious in nature or not. Familiar music
and hymns, catchphrases of encouragement (“Amen!’ “Say it, brother!”),
a preacher-like tone and delivery of a message, a commonly used
scriptural references, are not, for many African Americans, shibboleths of
their faith; rather, they are parts of a cultural tool kit to which broad and
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See Christopher G. Ellison & Darren Sherkat, The “Semi-Voluntary Institution”
Revisisted: Regional Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans, 73
SOCIAL FORCES 1415, 1415 (1995).
98 The following chart provides more texture and detail regarding WSC church
attendance. This chart does not include those who identified themselves as Hispanic,
Mexican, Asian or as belonging to some other ethnic group.
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Americans surveyed who never attend church or who have no church affiliation report
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diverse—at least within the community—groups have access. Mary
Pattillo sums it up this way:
The power of prayer, Christian imagery, and call-andresponse interaction lies not only in the possibility of
realizing concrete results from particular supplications, but
also in the cultural familiarity of these tools among African
Americans as media for interacting, conducting a meeting,
holding a rally, or getting out the vote. Black church culture
constitutes a common language that motivates social
action.101
In her work, Pattillo recounts numerous incidents in which participants of
secular meetings probably unthinkingly incorporated religious activities and
references simply because that was the “way to do things.”
In Commander Ervin’s case, however, it was not business as usual. For
Ervin, the decision to choose from among the church cultural menu as
opposed to the police secular one was deliberate and meaningful. His audience
understood his decision in that way, and took it to heart. This is not to say that
Ervin shed his identity as a police officer in making the choice to use church
culture as a strategy of action to bring churches closer to the police, as a
community development corporation officer astutely recognized. This officer
downplayed the fact that the Commander was ‘churched’ and emphasized that
the Commander was a man of faith who also wielded power as a civic servant:
CDC officer: Well, he is involved in a church, but his central point of power was
the fact he's a spiritual man. And he is a police commander, okay. Now, if it had
been Police Office Ava Columbus102 it wouldn't have worked even still because
they would not have looked to her for leadership. They would not have come
together voice. They came together because he's the commander of this district,
and he employs 350 police officers (inaudible) at will. And that's his power.
The interviewer: Okay.
101

Mary Pattillo, Church Culture as a Strategy of Action in the Black Community, 63 AM.
SOC. REV. 767, 768 (1998).
102 A pseudonym.
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CDC officer: So [community leaders] would respect that.

So far, we have emphasized Commander Ervin’s role in bringing
the many (mostly African American) churches into a closer relationship
with the Chicago Police Department. However, we want emphasize that
he was also critical to facilitating the creation of more linkages among
the churches themselves. In light of Hunter’s theory of social control, this
aspect of the prayer vigil might have be the more important result of the
WSC prayer vigil—especially given that the community prayer vigil was
spectacularly interdenominational. Interestingly, while it would appear
that the Commander’s access to church culture was probably the most
important factor that motivated individual church leaders to come to the
table with him as a police officer, we believe that it was the Commander’s
blue uniform and stripes—his role as a police officer and agent of the
state—that helped him to bring the interdenominational group to sit with
each other.
As an agent of the state, Commander Ervin was able to take on an
official position of neutrality that most of the participants recognized. In
his role as a public official, he was able to serve as a mediator among the
members of the interdenominational group so that all of the church
leaders could sit down together at the table. Commander Ervin’s persona
as a state actor offered a different benefit of neutrality. He was able to
bring the pastors together not only because he did not represent any
particular denomination, but also because he was not a pastor himself.
This was critical in a world in which church leaders are in competition
with one another for congregants. As a police officer with no church
congregation of his own, Commander Ervin presented little threat to
WSC ministers despite the fact that he organized a high-profile religious
event. Without his own church, Commander Ervin was unlikely to draw
congregants away from any of the WSC ministers’ churches—a practice
referred to as “sheep-stealing.” Illustrative are the comments of three
pastors: an elderly Baptist minister of a storefront church; the pastor of a
non-denominational and interracial church, and a Catholic regional
officer of a national interdenominational religious organization:

Elderly minister: Well, it looks like most of your ministers that he want
to do something himself instead of being, you know, unified. You know,
together we stand and divided we fall. . . . . [L]ook, sometime it’s jealousy,
you know. Some of them want to be their own churches and then when
he get a little ahead, then he won’t help the guy that, you know.
* * *

Interviewer: Well actually—let me ask you this. Do you think that the
churches could have come up with this idea? That this would have—if
Commander Ervin hadn't been there that the vigil would have -Rev. Non denominational: No. No. I don't think so. And that's because I
think, because I think the churches mirror sort of the larger society and
then there's all kinds of competition among us, distrust among churches,
and it's real petty stuff. I mean I (inaudible) membership kind of stuff,
and so in this sense you needed somebody outside the neighborhood.

***
Interviewer: But you were saying, and let me just make sure I
understand this, that [a particular minister] could have the vision or
maybe he has the right attitude, but it sounds as if -Religious Organization Leaders: There would be competition. There
would be ego problems.
Interviewer: But people don't perceive the commander to be in
competition with them?
Religious Organization Leaders: No. He's not a pastor of a church

Given these dynamics, it should now be clear why Commander
Ervin was successful in making connections to churches and
subsequently creating a cohesive interdenominational group, while his
predecessor, Commander Douglas Bolling, was not. Commander Ervin
deployed religious language to invite the ministers to work with him, but
he conducted meetings at the police headquarters—neutral state turf.
Commander Bolling, in contrast, invited the ministers to the table with
the neutral language of the state, but held meetings at particular
churches—typically Baptist. It is not surprising that he failed.
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While we have just explained the effect of the Commander’s
religiosity and his role as a police officer as serving distinct roles—i.e.,
religiosity being the critical factor to insure that ministers came to meet
with the Commander, and state neutrality being the key to bringing
disparate groups together—in reality these two facets worked together to
reinforce one another. So, for example, it wasn’t just the fact that the
Commander used religious language to invite the ministers to come
together that made the strategy effective. It was the fact that it was a
police officer using religious language that intrigued the ministers and
made them come out. In the ministers’ experience police officers didn’t
use religious language in their official capacity, and they certainly didn’t
propose prayer vigils on corners. The ministers also likely had their own
folklore regarding constitutional constraints on state actors that helped
to contribute to the power of the Commander’s invitation.103 In short, the
ministers’ understanding of the Commander’s role in the WSC prayer
vigil was that he was doing something that he was not supposed to do.
As such, his actions were interpreted by his audience as being costly to
him, and because his actions were so interpreted, the ministers did not
doubt his sincerity. By engaging in conduct that could subject him to
stringent criticism by his superiors, the Commander was able to signal to
the ministers that he was trustworthy.104 The Commander’s signal, in
turn, enabled the ministers to confer legitimacy on him (and by extension
the CPD—at least to a certain extent). In effect, the ministers acted as
103

This point did not come out directly in any of the interviews with the ministers. In
fact, only individuals affiliated with the police or municipal government even mentioned
the constitution or concerns about it. Elsewhere one of us has suggested that even
those line officers who supported the WSC prayer vigil and believed it to be consistent
with ideas of community policing might still believe that police officers should
participate in prayer vigil activities only on their “own time” because of some sense of
internalized, yet unarticulated constitutional norms. See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1626-29 (2002). Similarly, WSC ministers
likely have a body of assumptions about the law, or “legal consciousness,” that informs
their ability to assess the credibility of government actors such as Commander Ervin.
See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes
of Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 1055,
1059 (2000) (explaining that legal consciousness refers as much to how people do not
think or speak about the law as it does to what they do think and speak about it).
104 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (explaining a model of
cooperation and the production of social norms whereby individuals signal to one
another by engaging in costly behavior in order to prove credibly that they are “good”
rather than “bad” types).

certification intermediaries. They “vouched” for the police leader, who
formerly held a position of distrust.
III. THE PRAYER VIGIL AND THE CONSTITUTION
The data we have reviewed here suggest that, unlikely as it might
seem at first glance, activities such as the WSC prayer vigil can
contribute to a community context that promotes opportunities for
community residents to work together to achieve higher levels of safety
and general efficacy in their neighborhoods. Because of these features,
the WSC prayer vigil could be characterized as a particularly innovative
example of community policing. It is also undeniably true that the
collaboration between the Chicago Police Department and WSC ministers
described here implicates the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution—specifically the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause.105
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any “law
regarding the establishment of religion.” In the landmark case, Everson
v. Board of Education,106 the Supreme Court offered a resounding
interpretation of this language, declaring that the First Amendment
requires “a wall of separation between church and state” that “must be
kept high and impregnable.” More specifically, the majority asserted,
public funds cannot be used “to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.”107
In the fifty-eight years since Everson, the Supreme Court has
decided over fifty cases under the Establishment Clause.108 To assert
that this long line of cases has been the subject of criticism is an
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U.S. Const. Amend I. The First Amendment also prohibits laws that “interfere with
the free exercise of religion,” but this portion of the Religion Clause is for the most part
not relevant to the purposes of this paper.
106 330 US 1 (1947).
107 Id. at 16, 18.
108 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (2001).
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understatement. Although there have been many attempts to identify an
internal logic in the Court’s line of reasoning, judges and legal scholars
have been able to glean only general principles that are difficult to apply
in all but the most extreme cases of government support to religion.109
Our goal here is not to puzzle through the internal structure of the
Court’s opinions to assess the relevance of the Establishment Clause to
the WSC Prayer Vigil. We will instead focus on the extent to which
African Americans have been able to influence Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and the ways that that jurisprudence has influenced
them. A review of the litigation reveals the particular nature of the
involvement of African Americans in the development of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, and it demonstrates plainly the extent to which
judicial sanction of church-state interaction has had, and continues to
have, important racial consequences.
African Americans, through representative litigating institutions,
have consistently recognized the disparate impact of church-state
partnerships, but the Court has never acknowledged the non-religious
implications of its Establishment Clause decisions. As a result, there is a
disconnect between Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the
realities of disparate impact that is potentially problematic for AfricanAmerican communities. We believe excavation of the realities of disparate
impact is critical in assessing the extent to which modern church state
partnerships should be allowed or even blessed by the state. To that end,
we begin with a quick tour of Establishment Clauses cases relevant to
the welfare of African Americans—cases involving schools and cases
involving social service delivery.
A.

Government Aid to Religious Schools

Everson v. Board of Education is a landmark case not only because
it marks the beginning of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
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but also because it is the first Supreme Court decision on public aid to
religious schools. At the time of that decision, the vast majority of private
religious schools were Catholic, and many scholars have argued that
Everson and the school aid cases that followed over the next thirty years
were fueled to a large extent by anti-Catholic sentiment.110 For the
Protestant majority and a growing number of liberal intellectuals, the
Catholic Church represented “an authoritarian force that threatened
reasoned inquiry, democratic politics, and social unity.”111
In the African-American community, parochial school aid was
significant not as an issue of church-state relations or anti-Catholic
bigotry, but because of its implications for school desegregation. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education112 was met with
massive resistance, and many southern states prepared to avoid
desegregation by closing public schools altogether and using state
vouchers to fund all-white private schools.113 Although the Supreme
Court soon made it clear that closing public schools was not an option,
the number of private, segregationist academies increased dramatically
in the 1960s. In particular, the Court’s rejection of freedom-of-choice and
its endorsement of busing114 “triggered a massive exodus of whites from
public schools and a scramble to find private alternatives.”115 Many of
these new schools were Christian academies, established by white
churches. The leaders of these churches were explicit about their
motives. One Baptist pastor stated frankly that he “would never have
dreamed of starting a school, hadn’t it been for busing.” Another
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acknowledged that parents enrolled their children in Christian schools
“because they just don’t like blacks.”116
It was thus not surprising when the NAACP called on the black
community to oppose school aid; as one prominent minister observed,
religious schools were about to “succeed in carrying out a de facto form
of racial segregation with federal funds.”117 Recognizing that threat, the
New York NAACP’s president announced in 1967, “We are against aid in
any way, shape or form, because it only helps those who would skirt
legislation on desegregation.”118 In 1970, the Pennsylvania NAACP
succeeded in bringing Lemon v. Kurtzman119 before the Supreme Court, a
case that would set the standard for impermissible school aid and
become one of the most important Establishment Clause rulings in
American history.
1.

Religious School Aid and the Desegregation Battle: Lemon v.
Kurtzman

Alton Lemon was an African-American father whose children
attended public school in Pennsylvania. In conjunction with the NAACP,
he brought a two-fold challenge against recently enacted legislation that
used taxes to subsidize the cost of teacher’s salaries, textbooks, and
teaching materials in private schools. First, Lemon alleged that the effect
of the Nonpublic Schools Act would be “to encourage, promulgate and
perpetuate de facto segregation, to the detriment of the education
received by his and other black children in the public schools.”120 As a
result, Lemon claimed, the funding scheme violated his equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Lemon asserted that
because 96% of the private schools eligible for aid were religiously
affiliated, the Act constituted an establishment of religion and was
impermissible under the First Amendment.
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Lemon’s opponents did not challenge his assertion that the Act
would perpetuate segregation. Instead, they argued that Lemon lacked
standing to bring an equal protection claim because his children had not
been denied admission to any of the nonpublic schools that were
positioned to benefit from the Act. (In fact, Lemon had not sought to
enroll his children in any of these schools.) Kurtzman’s brief was devoted
almost entirely to Lemon’s First Amendment challenge.121
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lemon on the basis of his
Establishment Clause challenge. In doing so, the Court identified a
three-pronged test for permissible statutory law under the Establishment
Clause: the statute must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must
not be the advancement or inhibition of religion, and it must not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion. Pennsylvania’s
Nonpublic School Act violated the entanglement prong of this test.122
Although Lemon and the NAACP both dedicated significant portions of
their briefs to the issue of segregation, the Court addressed their equal
protection challenge only in a footnote, stating that the Establishment
Clause ruling in the case “makes it unnecessary for us to reach this
issue.”123 Still, it is unlikely that the racial implications of the ruling went
unnoticed by the Court.124
The interest of the NAACP and African Americans in opposing aid
to private schools that enabled whites to avoid desegregation is obvious.
It is less clear that school aid in itself undermined the black community.
Lemon and the NAACP both argued vehemently that the provision of
public money to religious schools involved impermissible aid to religion
under the First Amendment. Although the non-Catholic church-related
schools at that time were “virtually 100 percent white,” the Catholic
parochial school system served 10,000 black students in the city of
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Philadelphia alone.125 There were thus a significant number of black
families that stood to benefit from the Nonpublic School Act. However, as
Lemon emphasized, the vast majority of black children in the parochial
school system attended schools that were over 85% black. The
overarching issue for Lemon and the NAACP was racial segregation.
Lemon observed, “To its great credit the Philadelphia Archdiocese
supports and maintains fifteen black ghetto schools for black children . .
. but this is not integration.”126 There is no evidence that Lemon or the
NAACP had any vested interest in the Establishment Clause challenge
other than its potential usefulness in obtaining the desired outcome in
the case.
2.

Shifting Tides in the Black Community: Aguilar v. Felton

The tension between racial segregation and public funding of
religious schools has continued since Lemon was decided. As the battle
for school desegregation wore on during the 1970s, so did the Supreme
Court’s attack on religious school aid. By 1980, the Court had struck
down tuition reimbursement for low-income children,127 maintenance
and repair assistance for schools serving low-income families,128
reimbursement for standardized testing expenses,129 provision of school
services and education equipment,130 and funding for instructional
materials and field trips.131 In 1985, the Court hit the high water mark of
its “No Aid” position132 with its back-to-back rulings in Grand Rapids v.
Ball133 and Aguilar v. Felton.134 We will focus on Aguilar here.
Aguilar involved a challenge to a publicly funded program that
provided remedial assistance to low-income children with educational
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need, regardless of whether they attended public or private school. One
result of this program was that public school teachers were providing
services to children on the premises of religiously affiliated schools. While
there is no reference to the issue of segregation in the parties’ briefs or
the Court’s opinion,135 Aguilar marks an important turning point in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for African Americans: it is the first
time that a significant contingent of the black community had reason to
support public aid to religious schools. This schism continued to grow in
the late 1980s and 1990s, as black families grew frustrated with the
dismal quality of urban public schools and wanted other options for their
children. Indeed, there is solid evidence that black students at parochial
schools perform significantly better than their public school counterparts
and are much more likely to graduate from high school and attend
college.136 Programs that provide publicly funded vouchers for religious
schools began to receive substantial support from the black community,
with 72% of black parents favoring voucher programs in a 1997 poll.137
3.

Shifting Tides in the Supreme Court: Agostini v. Felton

As the landscape of religious school aid and its implications for
African Americans changed, so did the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Court shifted its
position on public aid to religious institutions, requiring only that the
government “be neutral in its allocation of funds” rather than “support
only secular activities.”138 After five justices suggested in a 1994 opinion
that it might be time to overrule Aguilar,139 fifteen parochial school
parents, mostly single working mothers, brought New York’s remedial
135
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education program back before the Court in Agostini v. Felton.140 Only
one of the briefs in the case mentioned the issue of racial segregation
and, interestingly, it did so in support of the school aid program. The
amicus brief argued that publicly funded remedial education in religious
schools increased the choices open to low-income parents and cited
evidence that school choice was “being used to combat racial
segregation” and had “become the preferred approach to desegregation in
districts throughout the country.”141 The parochial school parents did
not make race an issue in their argument, but did emphasize that all of
the children who benefited from the program were “economically and
educationally disadvantaged” and that the government’s intent was only
to “improve the lot” of such children.142 For many people, the litigation
symbolized a battle between poor, working parents who merely wanted
quality education for their children, and white elites whose opposition to
school aid was purely philosophical. To no one’s surprise, the Court
sided with the parents, overruling both their assumption in Aguilar that
teachers on religious school premises were likely to teach religion and
their conclusion in Grand Rapids that any educational aid to religious
schools necessarily creates an impermissible “symbolic union” between
church and state.
Not all African Americans sided with the parents in Agostini. As the
Supreme Court continued to relax its stand on religious aid in the 1990s
and early 2000s, the issue of religious school vouchers became
increasingly controversial in the black community. Black school choice
proponents formed an unlikely alliance with conservative white
evangelicals, arguing that publicly funded tuition assistance for religious
schools would provide low-income families with a desperately needed
alternative to failing urban public schools.143 Other African Americans
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argued that religious school aid would only benefit a small minority of
poor black students and that the majority would be left behind in rapidly
deteriorating public schools that lacked the money necessary to improve
their performance. In 2002, this tension surfaced full force in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris
. 144
4.

The Voucher Battle: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

Zelman involved a taxpayer challenge to the Ohio Pilot Scholarship
Program, which provided private school tuition aid for certain low-income
children in the Cleveland City School District. The taxpayers argued that
because 96% of the participating students attended religiously affiliated
schools, the program had the impermissible effect of advancing
religion.145
The respondents, not surprisingly, denied the First Amendment
charge, but they also introduced a novel argument into the school aid
debate: Even if the voucher program did advance religion, it should be
upheld on the ground that “the improvement it will bring to the
education of African-American students now attending Cleveland’s public
schools outweighs Establishment Clause concerns.”146 This claim was
supported in an amicus brief by a newly formed pro-voucher organization
entitled the Black Alliance for Educational Options. In the brief, BAEO
described itself as a non-profit, intergenerational organization
“committed to improving the educational opportunities available to
minority and low-income children.”147 Although the summary of
argument stated that the “case was not about religion, but about
educational policy,” most of the brief concerns the Establishment Clause
issue. BAEO argued that the voucher program did not have the primary
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effect of advancing religion and that it was administered in a religiously
neutral fashion. Only at the end of the brief did BAEO return to the issue
of educational opportunity, citing numerous studies about the success of
vouchers in failing school systems. They concluded that invalidating the
Cleveland
program
“would
force
thousands
of
economically
disadvantaged children to return to the substandard conditions of
Cleveland’s inner-city public schools.”148
The NAACP did not agree. In an amicus brief supporting the
taxpayers, the NAACP argued that the tuition assistance program raised
“grave dangers of . . . fostering the resegregation of schooling in
Cleveland.”149 As evidence, they pointed out that whites were
participating in the voucher program at a disproportionate rate compared
to number of white students in the school district. The brief makes no
argument with regard to the Establishment Clause challenge, concluding
only that the “Court should act to prevent the establishment of separate
private, predominantly white educational systems and public,
predominantly minority educational systems by rejecting” the Petitioner’s
argument.150
Zelman sparked intense conflict in the black community about the
desirability of school choice. Although the legal basis for the litigation
was the Establishment Clause, the debate surrounding the case had
nothing to do with religion or church-state relations. Nonetheless, as in
Lemon, the Supreme Court completely ignored the racial and class-based
implication of Cleveland’s tuition assistance program and based their
decision exclusively on the First Amendment. In a 5-4 ruling, the justices
held that the program was “entirely neutral with respect to religion” and
did not offend the Establishment Clause.

5.
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The Continuing School Aid Debate in the Black Community
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As one writer observed, “Strange days indeed, when the NAACP’s . .
. opponents are black school children singing ‘We Shall Overcome’ on the
courthouse steps.”151 Tuition assistance for nonpublic schools has
become increasingly popular in cities throughout the country, and the
black community remains divided about the impact of such programs. In
reflecting on the history of religious school aid rulings in the context of
the African-American community, the most interesting observation is
that the actual issue of religious establishment has been entirely
ancillary to the issue of racial segregation and educational opportunity.
Although shifts in Establishment Clause jurisprudence have, for the
most part, paralleled shifts in the impact of religious school aid on black
schoolchildren, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the racial
consequences of its school aid rulings. As a result, there is a severe
disconnect between the internal logic of the Court’s opinions and
external influences and implications of the litigation leading up to those
opinions. Zelman raises an important question: Can benefits for a
historically disadvantaged population outweigh religious establishment
concerns in determining the constitutional validity of a school aid
program? By focusing the Zelman opinion exclusively on the
Establishment Clause challenge, the Court left this question
unanswered.
B.

Faith-Based Social Services

The use of public money to fund private social services has a long
history in the United States; as early as 1898, New York City distributed
57% of its money for relief of the poor to private agencies.152 Throughout
this history, churches and religious organizations have been at the
forefront in providing social services, with “religiously motivated persons
[typically] . . . the first into areas of societal need.”153 As government
contracting with nonprofit agencies increased dramatically over the past
40 years, so did the amount of public money going to churches and
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religious organizations. Each year, billions of tax dollars are funneled
through religiously affiliated programs for the provision of health care,
foster care, drug and mental health treatment, job training, child care,
and a host of other social services.154 The New York Roman Catholic
archdiocese alone receives $1.75 billion annually in government funds.155
Although some of these services are provided in a secular manner, many
of the churches and religious nonprofits that receive public funds
continue to incorporate religious doctrine and faith-based practices into
their services. A recent study by Stephen Monsma found that among
religiously based child service agencies, 71% have religious symbols or
pictures in their facilities; 64% have spoken prayers at meals; 70% have
“informal references to religious ideas by staff with clients”; 35% have
required religious activities; and 33% “encourage religious commitments”
by clients.156 As Monsma observes, “One of the best kept-secrets in the
United States is that when it comes to public money and religious
nonprofit organizations, sacred and secular mix.”157
1.

The Constitutionality of
Bowen v. Kendrick

Faith-Based

Social

Services:

Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence includes only one
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of providing public funds
for social services by religious entities. Decided in 1988, Bowen v,
Kendrick158 involved a challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which
provided federal grants to public and private organizations for the
purpose of providing services relating to teenage sexual activity and
pregnancy. Because religious organizations were included among
grantees, the plaintiffs argued that the Act constituted an impermissible
establishment of religion. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge,
holding that “direct government aid to religiously affiliated institutions
[does] not have the primary effect of advancing religion.”159 Although the
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plaintiffs also argued that the program created “an unacceptable risk”
that the grant money would be used to promote religion, the majority
disagreed, stating “we refus[e] to presume that the [grant] would be used
in a way that would have the primary effect of advancing religion.”160
Although Bowen specifically states that social service providers
may only use public money for secular purposes, its rejection of the
plaintiffs’ “unacceptable risk” argument had the practical effect of
making it extremely difficult to win broad-based Establishment Clause
challenges to government grant programs. Instead, a plaintiff must
litigate on a grant-by-grant basis and show that specific grant recipients
are using public money to promote religion.161 This aspect of Bowen
explains why there has been so little litigation regarding religious activity
by government-funded social service providers: it is simply not worth the
effort for the ACLU or other separation watchdogs to litigate against
specific grants to specific religious organizations. The most important
exception to this non-litigation pattern is Wilder v. Bernstein,162 a faithbased social service case decided by the Second Circuit in 1988.
2.

Faith-Based Social Services and Disparate Racial Impact:
Wilder v. Bernstein

Wilder was the culmination of a series of lawsuits challenging the
New York City Department of Social Service’s pervasive use of sectarian
foster care agencies and its practice of placing children in agencies
affiliated with the same religious denomination as the child’s legal
parent(s). Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, Shirley
Wilder, a black, Protestant foster child, complained that the provision of
state funds to sectarian agencies and the Department’s religiousmatching scheme violated the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.
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With regard to the establishment claim, Wilder argued that the
Department’s practice of providing public funds to sectarian agencies
impermissibly advanced religion and involved the favoring of some
religions over others and over nonreligion. Although the free exercise
claim is outside the scope of this article, the equal protection claim is
interesting because, like Lemon in his challenge to parochial school aid,
Wilder argued that the church-state partnership at issue resulted in
discrimination against blacks and other minorities. In New York City, the
best foster care facilities were overwhelmingly Jewish and Catholic-run.
Because the statutory scheme gave Jewish and Catholic children first
rights to placement with these agencies, Protestant children were, on the
basis of their religion, sent to inferior Protestant, secular, or public
facilities. Wilder asserted that these placements were racially
discriminatory because white children were more likely to be Catholic
and Jewish, and black children were more likely to be Protestant. As a
result, “black children waited longer than white children for placement;
and black children were more often and in numbers disproportionate to
white children placed with agencies of inferior quality.”163
The first district court to consider Wilder’s claims conceded that
the Department’s practices did violate “the literal language of the
Establishment Clause,” but held that this infringement was justified by
two legitimate state interests: the right of legal parents to determine the
religious upbringing of their children, and the right of foster children to
free exercise of religion.164 The three-judge court concluded that the
statutes and practices at issue represented “a fair and reasonable
accommodation” between the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the First Amendment. When a new complaint was filed five years later
(essentially continuing the original lawsuit),165 the new district court
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judge came to the same conclusion, balancing Establishment Clause
concerns with “other equally important provisions of the Constitution.”166
As in the school-aid cases, the racial discrimination charges fell by
the wayside. In the first round of litigation, the district court explicitly
limited its inquiry to the Establishment Clause challenge, declining to
consider Wilder’s equal protection claim. Eventually, the parties entered
into a settlement agreement that required the Department of Human
Services to ensure that black, Protestant children had equal access to
the best facilities by implementing a “first come, first serve” policy when
demand for a particular placement exceeded availability. The last round
of Wilder litigation was instigated by sectarian agencies that objected to
the settlement and argued, among other things, that the “first come, first
serve” policy was a race-conscious remedy without empirical
justification. The district court and Second Circuit both rejected this
argument, not because they found sufficient evidence to justify a raceconscious remedy, but because they concluded that the “first come, first
serve” policy was not race-conscious.167 Thus, at no point in the entire
litigation did any of the courts consider whether New York City’s practice
of religious-matching in foster care placements actually violated the
equal protection rights of black children. The cases were decided entirely
on the basis of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. As in the
school-aid cases, the judiciary acted as if the only issue presented was
one of church and state and ignored the racial undertones and
implications of the litigation.
C.

WSC and the Constitution

The preceding review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
makes clear that the African American struggle for civil rights has
intersected in important ways with the Court’s development of ideas
regarding the separation of church and state. The review also highlights
the extent to which African Americans, or at least key African American
166

385 F. Supp. at 1029.
See Wilder, 848 F.2d at 1345; Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1320-22 (S.D.
N.Y. 1986).
167

WHEN 2 OR 3 COME TOGETHER
political institutions, have conceptualized the community’s interests in
the Establishment Clause. For the most part, the litigation pattern
suggests that the African American community’s interest in the
Establishment Clause has been very instrumental—a legal vehicle used
to achieve a higher end such as desegregation. And, desegregation, while
clearly pursued for its own moral value, also had instrumental value to
those litigating cases like Lemon. African Americans hoped that their
children would have access to high quality education through
desegregation. One can easily see this last point by looking to more
recent cases such as Zelman. There Establishment Clause concerns, at
least for some African American litigants, took a backseat to an interest
in educational quality, which the litigants hoped to achieve through a
more liberal voucher policy. Note that even the NAACP, who supported
the taxpayers claiming that Ohio’s program violated the Establishment
Clause, did not press a First Amendment argument. The NAACP,
opposed the voucher plan out of a concern that the program would
reestablish segregated public schools.
In light of the centrality of church-like norms, religious language,
and other social practices readily flowing from the towering institutions
of African American cultural life, the lack of concern about, or at least
attention to, the potential dangers that outsiders see regarding close
church-state relationships exhibited by representative African American
institutions is perhaps not surprising. Indeed the central role of
churches in African American communities help explains not only
Commander Ervin’s success in facilitating the WSC prayer vigils, but also
the seemingly inconsistent litigation positions of the NAACP in Lemon on
the one hand, and the BAEO and NAACP in Zelman on the other. In no
case did the kinds of “traditional” Establishment Clause concerns
identified by the Everson Court ever loom large for these groups. Given
that one could make the argument that the groups of people most
affected by a particular policy (African American public schools students
in Ohio, residents of high crime neighborhoods in Chicago) are less
troubled by potential constitutional problems than less impacted

outsiders, should one conclude that collaborations between the state and
the church like the WSC prayer vigil should be sanctioned?168
It would be ironic, to say the least, to conclude that activities such
as the WSC prayer vigil should be prohibited given that the communitybased problems to be remedied on Chicago’s West Side have a particular
history. That history is one of political exclusion and marginalization—
marginalization that made it difficult for community members of the past
to acquire the resources necessary to avert the kinds of processes that
Shaw and McKay argue lead to crime. In that atmosphere, African
American residents of urban disadvantaged neighborhoods created their
own civil institutions—the church being one—the deal with communitybased problems. It is natural, then, that residents would turn to this
venerable institution when taking the beginning steps to reestablish (or
establish) working relationships with political and government actors.
And it would be sad—perhaps even an outrage—to use the Constitution
to prevent residents of impoverished communities from drawing on this
longstanding source of civic strength and power.
The Zelman litigants in their brief offer a framework for thinking
about the WSC prayer vigil in its proper historical context. They proposed
a balancing test. That is, they argued that even if Cleveland’s voucher
program violated the Establishment Clause on its face, it should be
upheld on the ground that “the improvement it will bring to the
education of African-American students . . . outweighs Establishment
Clause concerns.”
This approach is attractive because it breaks down
the somewhat artificial lack of balancing in the First Amendment religion
cases. The most problematic element of the current Lemon test is that, at
least facially, it is a purely formal inquiry: whether or not a state action
constitutes religious establishment has nothing to do with the context in
which the action takes place. Although the historical development of

168 Compare Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of ) Order in the
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC. REV. 805, 830-32 (1998) (arguing that it is important that
courts, when considering the constitutionality of crime policy consider the views of
those most affected by the policy and according this group more weight than the views
of outsiders).
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establishment clause jurisprudence strongly suggests that the justices
are swayed by the circumstances surrounding challenged activity, the
Court’s reasoning is always expressed as if it takes place in a vacuum,
inconsiderate of the extra-religious impact of its decisions. This could be
precisely why it is so difficult to identify an internal logic in the Court’s
opinions; they fail to articulate the true scope of the Lemon inquiry,
which necessarily involves some balancing of competing state interests.
Constitutional balancing outside of the Establishment Clause context is
widespread. The Court has acknowledged the role of interest-weighing in
almost every other area of constitutional law, including freedom of
speech,169 substantive due process,170 procedural due process,171 equal
protection,172 separation of powers,173 privileges and immunities,174
dormant federal commerce power,175 and even free religious exercise.176
Why not here? The balancing approach to religious establishment
eliminates the need for artificial formalistic debate over church-state
interactions and provides a platform for examining the empirical
questions that currently divide the black community: Does parochial
school aid hurt disadvantaged students? Is the provision of federally
funded social services by black churches good for black communities?
Can church-police partnerships improve the safety of poverty-stricken
neighborhoods? Under current establishment jurisprudence, these
inquiries are irrelevant. In reality, they are often the heart of the matter.
In fact, one way to look at the litigation path we described above is
to say that African American litigants in establishment cases have
implicitly made a balancing argument since Lemon. While it could be
coincidental that establishment jurisprudence has, in so many ways,
paralleled the interests of African Americans, it appears that the
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Supreme Court has not been immune to the racial implications of its
establishment decisions. The problem here is that the explicit
identification of race as a factor under the Lemon test could constitute
impermissible racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
This might explain the reluctance of the Court to recognize the racial
implications of its decisions—allowing Cleveland’s voucher program to
continue solely on the basis of its benefit to black children would put the
Court on very dangerous ground.177 However, it is certainly permissible
for the state to undertake efforts to improve the quality of life in povertystricken neighborhoods; as the Court held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,178
wealth is not a suspect classification. A church-state partnership in a
poor, black neighborhood might be justified not because the community
is black, but because the centrality of the church in that community
creates a situation in which the most efficient and effective way for the
government to serve that community is through its religious institutions.
The Equal Protection Clause impacts the ways in which black litigants
can frame their contextual arguments, but it does not prevent courts
from considering the unique role of faith-based institutions in black
communities. Moreover, even in cases bringing race-based Equal
Protection challenges, courts have been willing to give special leeway to
police and public safety arguments.179
CONCLUSION: CHURCHES, POLICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
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While the doctrine erected around the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses is the antithesis of clarity, the basic purposes of those Clauses
are fairly straightforward. Thus, courts have worried about government’s
excessive interference with or promotion of religion to insure that no
individual is forced by the state to undertake a religious practice that he
or she does not want to, or forced to believe in a deity at all thereby
assuring the “fullest scope of religious liberty and tolerance.”180 This idea
has led to judicial tests to seek out coercion and endorsement.181 We
have suggested that the concerns of those tests in the context of the WSC
prayer vigils may be at worst misplaced or, at best, unhelpful, because of
cultural norms and practices of the relevant neighborhood residents. But
there is additional goal of the First Amendment Religion Clauses that is
very relevant to the events that took place in WSC, and, indeed relevant
to the social process that we seek to promote here. Specifically, another
goal of the Religion Clauses is to “avoid that divisiveness based upon
religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government
and religion alike.”182 One reason why social processes in WSC were not
activated in ways that brought the greatest potential for crime reduction
and prevention was because there was conflict among the community’s
important institutions based, at least in part, on religion. However,
Justice Breyer’s presumed strategy of greater secularization to quiet the
conflict is unlikely to succeed in WSC where church culture is so
prominent. Instead, a different route, one that at once promotes a
religious approach to dealing with community leaders and official statebased neutrality appeared to be the prescription—a prescription in many
ways in accord with the goal underlying the Religion Clauses themselves.
Vigilance is still in order, however. The very success of the Vigils
and the ensuing accretion of political power of the WSC ministers in
municipal government possibly may lead to a concern for the relative
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power of other religious groups in WSC. As long as all religious groups
have equal access to municipal resources, then there is little reason to
worry, but to the extent that there is evidence that one sect is favored
over another, or even shut out altogether (i.e., is the Nation of Islam at
the table?), then one might rightly wonder whether endorsement and
coercion ought to play more of a role in regulating the local activities in
WSC. Where would that regulation come from? We end with a cautionary
tale, the story of Kiryas Joel.183
Kiryas Joel Village is a community of ultra-orthodox Hasidic Jews
located 50 miles northwest of New York City. Following the Holocaust,
surviving members of the Satmar Hasidic sect relocated from Europe to
the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. By 1975, the Satmar
community had grown too large for its forty square block enclave in
Brooklyn, and decided to purchase 320 acres of land in Monroe, New
York. A zoning dispute soon arose with the township, leading the
Satmars to incorporate their land as the Village of Kiryas Joel in 1977.
The village now has over 12,000 residents, all of whom are members of
the Satmar Hasidic sect. Children make up well over half of the
population.
The Kiryas Joel community is devoutly religious and maintains a
lifestyle that bears little resemblance to that of mainstream society. They
interpret the Torah strictly and speak Yiddish as their primary language.
Men and women are segregated outside the home and wear
unconventional clothes that include head coverings and special garments
for boys and modest dresses for girls. Television, radio, and Englishlanguage publications are prohibited. Children are educated at private,
sex-segregated religious schools, where boys receive extensive training in
the Talmud and girls are prepared for their roles as wives and mothers.
While the two parochial schools in Kiryas Joel were intended to
serve the entire community, they did not have the resources necessary to
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provide special education services to children with disabilities. Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, these children were entitled
to adequate special education even though they were enrolled in private
schools. Thus, the challenge facing New York State and the MonroeWoodbury Central School District (in which the village was located) was
how to provide special education services to the handicapped children of
Kiryas Joel.
The New York legislature determined that this situation constituted
an educational crisis, and decided that special education services should
be offered within the community of Kiryas Joel. With the support of the
Monroe-Woodbury school district and the village, the legislature enacted
a special statute that established Kiryas Joel as “a separate school
district” that would “have and enjoy all powers and duties of a union free
school district under the provisions of the education law.” The statute
empowered a locally elected school board to open and close schools, hire
teachers, prescribe textbooks, and establish disciplinary rules. Governor
Cuomo called the new law “a good faith effort to solve the unique
problem” of educating the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel.
Only one public school was opened by the new district, a special
education school that served about 40 full-time students and 160 parttime students. Non-handicapped children in Kiryas Joel continued to
attend parochial school and used the new school district only for
transportation, remedial education, and health and welfare services. (If a
non-handicapped child had requested public education, the district
would have paid tuition to send the child to another school district
nearby.) Neighboring school districts made arrangements to send their
handicapped Hasidic children to the Kiryas Joel public school; two-thirds
of the full-time students were from outside the village. Despite the
religious nature of the village, the Kiryas Joel public school was wholly
secular, with non-Satmar teachers and staff, co-education of boys and
girls, and a secular curriculum. The superintendent hired to manage the
district, Dr. Steven Bernando, was not a member of the Satmar
community. Although some members of an ultraconservative wing of the
community felt the presence of the secular school violated the Torah,

most residents of the village were pleased with the new arrangement, as
were neighboring school districts and state officials.
Despite the satisfaction of the involved parties with the statute, a
number of taxpayers opposed the new school district. A lawsuit was filed
challenging the constitutionality of the statute that created the Kiryas
Joel Village School District. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court
held that the statute did indeed involve impermissible entanglement of
church and state and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.184 In response, eleven days later, the New York legislature
passed a new statute, Chapter 241, that was intended to provide a
religion-neutral mechanism for re-establishing the Kiryas Joel school
district. The new law allowed all qualifying municipalities to “organize a
new union free school district . . . consisting of the entire territory of
such municipality, whenever the educational interests of the community
require it.” A seceding district was required to have at least 2,000
children and surpass the state average in wealth, although its secession
could not adverse affect the larger district. In addition, chapter 241 only
applied to cities, towns and villages in existence on an effective date.
Kiryas Joel quickly applied to re-establish its school district, and the
Monroe-Woodbury Board of Education voted unanimously to approve the
secession. Thus, the Kiryas Joel Village School District was reestablished within weeks of the Supreme Court decision.
However, Chapter 241 was also challenged by taxpayers, on the
grounds that it singled out Kiryas Joel for special treatment and thereby
involved impermissible governmental endorsement of the Satmar
religious community. Indeed, Kiryas Joel was the only municipality in
New York that qualified for secession under the new law. In 1997, the
New York Court of Appeals agreed and struck down Chapter 241 as
unconstitutional.185
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A few months later, the New York legislature tried again, enacting
Chapter 390, which still allowed Kiryas Joel Village to create their own
school district but under broader guidelines. Governor Pataki estimated
that ten municipalities qualified under the new the law, later revising
that number to six. Opponents claimed the law applied to only two towns
and filed suit challenging its constitutionality. Although the school
district won the first round of litigation, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed in 1999, concluding again that the law violated the
Establishment Clause because it involved special treatment of a religious
community.186
This time, the New York legislature was prepared: two months
earlier, they had passed a fourth law that would allow the reestablishment of the Kiryas Joel school district but which expanding the
criteria for secession even further. The new statute was broad enough to
cover 29 municipalities in New York. Kiryas Joel Village was again
approved as a separate school district, and although opponents
threatened to sue for a fourth time, it does not appear that a lawsuit was
ever filed.
The Kiryas Joel Village School District exists today, operating one
special education school that employs 24 teachers and serves 179
students. In 1999-2000, per pupil expenditure was $74,048 (almost
seven times the average expenditure per pupil in New York state public
schools). Dr. Bernando still serves as superintendent and the school
continues to be wholly secular in its management and curriculum. Thus,
despite fifteen years of litigation and four different formal policies, special
education services are now provided to Kiryas Joel children in the same
way originally envisioned by the state legislature when they first
undertook the issue in 1985.187
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On the one hand the story of Kiryas Joel can be seen as a success
story. The Kiryas Joel “problem” arose because a Supreme Court ruling
forced Monroe-Woodbury to close their special education site at the
parochial school in Kiryas Joel. Underlying these rulings was a
fundamental value judgment by the Supreme Court about what the
relationship between church and state should look like in a good society.
In this context, the Kiryas Joel statute can be seen as the New York
legislature’s response; that is, the statute represents the legislature’s
judgment about what constitutes an appropriate relationship between a
state government and a religious community such as Kiryas Joel. While
the legislature could not challenge the decisions already made by the
Court, it did have the ability to enter uncharted legal territory in an
attempt to preserve whatever flexibility they could in their dealings with
religious groups. This volleying is partly a struggle over power, but it is
also driven by judgments about the value of church-state relationships.
The taxpayers’ decision to challenge the statute also represented a
judgment about the value of state cooperation and accommodation of
religious groups, namely a belief that the Kiryas Joel statute represented
an undesirable endorsement of a particular religion by the government.
The story has a successful ending because the children received the
services that they needed, and the challengers, presumably, decided that
the legislature’s design providing for the services met their requirements
(or, at least was not worth complaining about).
The story of Kiryas Joel suggests that a successful outcome could
be reached should the events in WSC be subject to challenge. And, such
a challenge might generate a productive volleying that could check some
of the more negative outcomes we worried about above. But suppose
there is no litigation. No one has ever discussed bringing the City of
Chicago into court over the WSC prayer vigils. Is this a good thing?
Perhaps it is not. Without litigation, it is not clear what check exists to
insure that unconstitutional excesses don’t take place. The state
legislatures of New York were tenacious in the face of multiple taxpayer
challenges, but there is no guarantee that Chicago’s municipal officials
would exert such energy. Without legislative or executive pushback
against challengers, the volleying we saw in Kiryas Joel is not generated,
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and there is no guarantee of a positive outcome. In such a world,
perhaps the absence of litigation is a good thing for the West Side of
Chicago.

